

Germany

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Geography and History

The Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) is located at the heart of Europe. It has nine neighbors: Denmark in the north, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and France in the west, Switzerland and Austria in the south, and the Czech Republic and Poland in the east. Being in the center of Europe, Germany is a link between East and West as well as between Scandinavia and the Mediterranean region. Germany covers 357,021 square kilometers, an area that is slightly smaller than Montana. The geography is diverse. The country has lowlands in the north, uplands in the center, and Bavarian Alps in the south. Germany has a population of 82.3 million, which makes it one of the most densely populated countries of Europe (Kappler and Reichart 1996; CIA *World Factbook*).

The roots of the German nation are usually dated back to the eighth century and initially consisted of people in the eastern part of the Franconian realm. The emperor Charlemagne united people speaking Germanic and Romance dialects. The word *Deutsch* (German) was probably first used in the eighth century to define the language spoken in the eastern part of the Franconian realm. The region's name, *Deutschland* (Germany), stems from that root. The transition to the German Reich is usually dated back to 911, when Conrad I was elected ruler;

he is considered to have been the first German king. His official title was first "Frankish King" and later "Roman King." The country was called Roman Empire after the eleventh century and Holy Roman Empire after the thirteenth century (Kappler 1996).

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were times of disorder for Germany. The reformation led by Martin Luther, the religious conflicts between Protestants and Catholics, the Peasant's Revolution of 1525, and the Augsburg Peace in 1555—which was a settlement stating that each prince could choose between Lutheranism and Roman Catholicism for his territory—were the milestones of the century. The conflict between Protestants and Catholics continued into the next century; this resulted in the Thirty Years' War, which turned into a systemic war in Europe and ended with the 1648 Peace of Westphalia. The Westphalia agreement is considered the founding document of the modern nation-state system that we live in today.

However, Germany failed to consolidate as a nation-state in the following centuries. The old Holy Roman Empire survived until it was destroyed by the Napoleonic Wars of 1792–1815; instead, German sovereign states established the German Confederation, which lasted until 1866. This was a loose confederation

composed of thirty-nine states (Columbia Encyclopedia). Germany as a nation-state was founded in 1871 by Premier Otto von Bismarck. The first seventy-five years of Germany as a nation-state are a history of interstate conflicts; beginning with the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, aggressive German foreign policy has been one of the main reasons behind two world wars. These wars ruined the country and led to its being divided into two states from 1945 to 1990.

With the decline of communism in the early 1990s, East and West Germany unified, and the victorious four allies of World War II lifted the supervision on Germany. No other European country was more deeply affected by the end of the Cold War than Germany. The changes in the alliances, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Eastern Europe, unification of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and German Democratic Republic (GDR)—all shifted the balance of power in Europe in favor of Germany.

More than four decades after the war, Germany regained its full sovereignty in the early 1990s (Bluth 2000).

Presently, Germany is the largest economy and the most populous nation in the European Union. Thus in future Continental issues, such as the economy, politics, and defense, Germany is a key actor. Two world wars, the occupation of Germany by the Allies, and the East-West confrontation in the Cold War have been the important factors that have shaped today's German security and foreign policy.

After the normalization of the status of Germany during early 1990s, the great economic power and influence of Germany in the EU and Europe at first led to suspicion about an increase of German power. However, German foreign and security policy proved to be peaceful. The developments in German foreign policy showed that the country is sincerely in favor of reducing the size of its own military—the Bundeswehr—and basing its security policy on multilateral arrange-

Table 1 Germany: Key Statistics

Type of government	Federal republic
Population (millions)	82,398,326 (July 2003)
Religion	Protestant 34%, Roman Catholic 34%, Muslim 3.7%, unaffiliated or other 28.3%
Main industries	Iron, steel, coal, cement, chemicals, machinery, vehicles, machine tools, electronics, food and beverages, shipbuilding, textiles
Main security threats	Political and economic instability in Southern and Eastern Europe, especially civil wars in Europe
Defense spending (% GDP)	1.38% (2002)
Size of military	active, 284,500; reserves, 358,650 (2002)
Number of civil wars since 1945	none
Number of interstate wars since 1945	none

Sources

- Central Intelligence Agency Website. 2004. *CIA World Factbook*. <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/> (accessed May 15, 2005).
 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS). 2003. *The Military Balance 2003–2004*. London: IISS and Oxford University Press.

ments, most of all by emphasizing the European Union.

Today, Germany has the largest economy and is the most populous nation of the European Union. The country's strategic position between East and West also contributes to its further importance for the EU. Germany is not only an important force in Europe but also a major world economy. The total production of the country was \$1.976 trillion in 2002, which makes it the third biggest economy of the world, after the United States and Japan (World Bank Group). However, this very powerful and advanced economy slowed during the 1990s. One of the main reasons for this relatively weak performance has been the costs associated with the modernization and integration of the East German economy. Transfers from West to East equal roughly \$70 billion each year. In addition, Germany's aging population and high unemployment raised questions about the social security system. Combined with those difficulties are the challenges of European integration. Presently Germany is in breach of the EU's 3 percent debt limit, because of rising government expenditures and a fall in revenues (CIA *World Factbook*).

In terms of its government and politics, Germany is a consolidated democracy. It is a federal republic composed of sixteen states as administrative units. The main political parties are Alliance '90/Greens, Christian Democratic Union (CDU); Christian Social Union (CSU); and Social Democratic Party (SPD). Since 1998, SPD and Greens—the Red-Green coalition—has ruled Germany.

Regional Geopolitics

The end of the Cold War was celebrated by the European nations, in the hope that

the East-West conflict would now come to an end. In fact, the last decade proved that to be so: a conflict between Western Europe and the former communist countries is only a remote possibility. Many socialist countries of Eastern Europe have become, and will remain, members of Western political and economic organizations, such as NATO or the EU. However, both Europe and Germany face new challenges in the new century. The threat is no longer the military threat from the Soviets, however. The biggest security challenges for Germany and for most of Europe are the economic instability in the former Warsaw Pact countries and ethnic rivalries that may lead to civil and interstate wars in Europe (Sarotte 2001; Bluth 2000).

Mass migrations from the east because of political upheavals—that is, ethnic conflicts or economic deprivations—are two of the biggest problems for German security. Schlör (1993) suggests that because of its geographical position, Germany is open to mass migration and waves of refugees. By September 1992, Germany had taken in more than 220,000 refugees from the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina alone. In addition, Germany's liberal laws on political asylum and generous social service provisions make the country attractive for political asylum seekers. To give an example from the first years of the post-Cold War era, 256,000 people in 1991 and 438,191 people in 1992 sought political asylum in Germany (ibid.). By 1995 the foreign population of Germany amounted to 8.8 percent, leading to the revival of a xenophobia that threatened the political stability of the country (Bluth 2000).

Second, economic instabilities in Eastern Europe can be a source of security problems for Germany. Eastern Europe

and Russia are important export markets for Germany, as well as sources of strategic raw materials (Schlör 1993). Third, ethnic issues in the region may take Germany into an interstate conflict. Germany might, for example, be drawn into a conflict to protect a German minority in Eastern or Southern Europe. The Kosovo problem was a prime example, in which Germany would have to be involved militarily. Similarly, if conflicts in Eastern and Southern Europe spill into areas close to Germany, the country could be adversely affected. A worst-case example might be radioactive fallout from an accident or from a terrorist attack on a power plant. Other potential threats include terrorist groups operating in Germany, especially fundamentalist Islamic groups, organized crime moving from East to West, Soviet-design nuclear power stations, and nuclear weapons in former Soviet territory (Bluth 2000). To sum up, then, Germany is in the center of Europe and affected by new security threats from all sides. For that reason Germany has emphasized the importance of collective security in Europe and European defense institutions.

Conflict Past and Present

The history of modern Germany is shaped by the historical rivalries and alliances of Europe in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Conflict with France, Britain, and the United States in the West; Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Russia in the East; and alliances with Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire in World War I and Italy and Japan in World War II are the milestones of German history in the first half of the twentieth century.

In terms of protracted conflicts, certainly the most important is the French-

German conflict. The fighting between France and Germany, which lasted at least three centuries, is among the longest and most intense wars in the history of international relations (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997).

The great conflicts of this rivalry are the Napoleonic Wars of 1792–1815; the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–1871; World War I (1914–1918); and World War II (1939–1945). During the Napoleonic Wars the French had some initial victories, but they lost the final battle at Waterloo in 1815. In 1870–1871, the Franco-Prussian war resulted in France's defeat and also the unification of Germany. In World War I and World War II, Germany defeated France but was eventually defeated by the Allies. In both conflicts, the two countries suffered enormous losses of men and resources.

In addition to these destructive wars, there were five international crises between France and Germany in the interwar period of 1918–1939: Rhenish rebellions in 1920 (Germany's noncompliance with post-World War I agreements), German reparations in 1921, Ruhr I in 1923, Ruhr II (disagreements about German reparations) in 1924, and the remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 (*ibid.*).

Another important international rivalry that involved Germany was the Czechoslovakia crisis in 1938–1939. According to the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) dataset, that conflict originated in 1919 when the German-speaking areas of the Sudetenland were allocated to the new Czechoslovak state. Hitler claimed those lands from the Czechoslovak state, which led to the escalation of the crisis. As a result, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy were called for the Munich Conference in September 1938, in which Britain and France appeased Germany

and gave up Czechoslovakian independence. Germany occupied the claimed lands and a bigger war was avoided—although only for one year.

Both World War I and World War II were initiated by German aggression. In both wars, Germany initially invaded most of Europe but was defeated at the end. In World War II, Germany was occupied by the Allies and given a special status for more than four decades. It was only after 1990 that the legacy of the war was lifted.

After the defeat of Germany in 1945, neither West nor East Germany was involved in a major armed conflict. In the postwar period, West German foreign policy depended mainly on disarmament, influence in international relations as a “civil power,” and peaceful unification of East and West Germany. By the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, Germany had no potential military confrontations with any of its neighbors, for the first time in its history. A relatively secure environment in Europe after the Cold War has led to the restructuring and downsizing of the German armed forces over the last decade (Bluth 2000).

Alliance Structure

The important past and present alliance structure of modern Germany can be analyzed under five headings. Germany participated in the Triple Alliance of 1882, the Central Alliance of World War I, the Axis Powers of World War II, and NATO and the Western European Union since 1955, and at present is the prime advocate for a future European defense system. Thus, the current alliance structure of Germany should be analyzed within a framework consisting of its relations with NATO, the Common Foreign and

Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU, and the United States.

The formation of the Triple Alliance began with the foundation of Germany as a nation-state in 1871. In the Franco-Prussian war of 1871–1872, France lost the provinces of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. That caused an enduring problem and hostility between the two countries that was yet to be resolved in the next century. Against this threat from France, Germany allied with Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Three Emperors’ League. However, because of the rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia in the Balkans, that alliance was never developed. After the Congress of Berlin in 1878, relations with Russia got worse, and German premier Bismarck made a secret defensive alliance with Austria-Hungary. In 1882, Italy had signed another secret treaty with Germany and Austria-Hungary as a result of its rivalry with France over Tunisia. The Triple Alliance was established and renewed periodically until 1913. Italy was never closely tied to the alliance, however, because of the conflict of interests with Austria-Hungary in the Balkan region (Columbia Encyclopedia).

“Central Powers” is a term used to define the alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria during World War I. Germany and Austria-Hungary had been allies since 1879, but Italy secretly decided not to be a member of the Triple Alliance in 1902. With the outbreak of World War I in 1914, the Ottoman Empire declared war on Russia in October and thus joined the Germany and Austria-Hungary alliance. Bulgaria was the last nation to enter the war, in October 1915, invading Serbia with Germany and Austria-Hungary. All the Central Powers signed the armistice

in the fall of 1918, as a result of the Allies' successful advance on many fronts (Wikipedia).

Between the two world wars, Germany was in a constant crisis with France about various issues. The enduring problems of the Franco-German conflict were not solved by the Versailles Agreement of 1919, and Italy had faced opposition in the League of Nations about its Ethiopia policies. Thus Germany and Italy became allies once again; the term first used by Benito Mussolini was the *Rome-Berlin Axis* when he referred to the treaty of friendship signed between the two countries in 1936. Japan joined the Axis in 1940 with the Tripartite Treaty. Then Hungary, Romania, Slovakia in 1940, and Bulgaria in 1941 joined the Axis as lesser powers. The alliance between the Axis powers came to an end with the end of World War II (Wikipedia).

In 1945, Germany unconditionally surrendered, and it was occupied by four Allied powers. The United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, and France divided the country into occupation zones and assumed the responsibility for its administration. In 1948, Allied administration ended, and in 1949 the Federal Republic of Germany in the west and German Democratic Republic in the east were established. After the foundation of the two states, the problem of Berlin became more important. However, negotiations with the Soviet Union about a reunification did not solve the problems; beginning in 1954, NATO members regularized their relations with the Federal Republic.

In October 1954 the Paris agreement was signed, in which the three Western powers agreed to terminate the occupation regime, recognize the Federal Republic of Germany as a sovereign state,

and invite the Federal Republic of Germany to join NATO and accede to the Western European Union. On May 5, 1955, the FRG became a member of NATO. In 1990, West Germany and the Soviet Union agreed on East Germany's membership in NATO during the unification process (NATO Update 2004).

The 1990s witnessed the end of the Cold War and the formation of new alliances in the world. Although Germany is a firm ally of NATO and the United States, German foreign policy-makers emphasize the necessity of a European security and defense policy independent from but coexisting with NATO. To make a finer analysis of the current alliance structure and the transformation of German security policy, we need to focus on the changing German foreign policy, the deepening of the European integration with new institutional designs such as Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the relations with NATO and the United States.

Since the establishment of the Federal Republic, German foreign and security policy has been based on the concept of *Westintegration*. Either under Konrad Adenauer's *Politik der Stärke* (that is, "politics by strength," which entailed a powerful Germany against the Soviets and a closer alliance with the West) or Willy Brandt's *Ostpolitik* (meaning "east politics," suggesting a more neutral stand in the West-East confrontation and *détente*), the main idea was to be connected to the Western political institutions. That was not only because of the international agreements following World War II; the German government also committed itself to *Westintegration* to complete the rehabilitation of Germany in the international system, to overcome the historical Franco-German rivalry for

hegemony in Europe, and to regain the freedom of action in international relations. However, all these aims were difficult to achieve because of the special position of Germany. Thus Germany, to be able to pursue an independent foreign policy, has become an advocate of multilateralism in Europe and using intergovernmental organizations, such as the EU or NATO, to solve international disputes and foster cooperation. In fact, it was argued in the literature that foreign policy and diplomacy emphasizing European policy were the means whereby the new German state constructed its own identity (Duffield 1998; Bluth 2000).

The unexpected end of the Cold War and the opportunity for unification denoted the beginning of substantial changes required in German security and foreign policy. These developments benefited Germany most in political and economic ways. Briefly, Germany is the third largest economy of the world; demographically it is the most populous of the EU, in the center of the continent, in a strategically advantageous position. In addition, the withdrawal of Soviet forces, with Germany gaining and the Soviets losing territory, changed the military balance of power in favor of Germany. Beyond those developments, pressure by the United States and the other Allies on Germany to take a more active role in security issues created such an environment that German policymakers could no longer continue their diplomatically active, militarily pacifist agenda.

The support for further integration of the EU and efforts to create a solid European security system have been key characteristics of German defense policy in the last decade. German policymakers trust the institutional designs of Europe to prevent domestic economic and politi-

cal instabilities, as well as creating a common defense policy. The first example of an important step for further integration was the Single European Act of 1987, which began the substantial integration of European economic institutions.

In terms of political integration, the milestone has been the Treaty on European Union—or Maastricht Treaty—in 1992. With that treaty, the EU has left the entirely intergovernmental and ineffective European Political Cooperation (EPC) policies and established the Common Foreign and Security Policy. With Maastricht, the members of the EU committed themselves to common and joint action on all issues except defense, and agreed on asking for the help of the Western European Union on defense matters (Forster and Wallace 2000).

The careful language of the treaty, distinguishing common defense issues from others, is important. Germany is the greatest supporter of further integration, especially on foreign policy and security matters. Other than the specific reasons that force German policymakers to suggest multilateralism, pan-Europeanists also believe that without a common foreign and security policy, further development of the economic and monetary union would be limited. That is why Germany insisted on a deeper integration, with the French and Germans at the center. The creation of a significant security policy for the EU is imperative for that aim (Nuttall 2000; Bluth 2000).

However, that view was not shared by all major powers of Europe, such as the United Kingdom, and is approached suspiciously by the United States. CFSP is already the most difficult policy to accomplish because of its connections to high politics issues such as sovereignty, national identity, and statehood. Also, in a

union like the EU, in which there are vast differences between the members, there are always various agendas and clashing national interests. Beyond all those political and institutional matters, the way in which members perceive how the institutions should look differs greatly, too. The United Kingdom's continuous Euroskepticism, its different "philosophy" as to the future of the EU—especially on CFSP areas—is an important challenge for Germany and the further development of the CFSP. According to the British perspective, the core of European security and defense is NATO and the alliance with the United States, and there is no need for European defense institutions.

Although Germany would agree with Britain that European defense cannot be established without NATO and U.S. involvement, it still emphasizes the importance of a separate institutional design that will develop a pan-European peace order. According to German policymakers, the EU is the heart of that stability; to extend this beyond the borders of Europe and defend Europe, CFSP and a Common Defense Policy are imperative.

In addition to these pressures, the CFSP and CDP were a result of moves by the United States to push Europe to share the defense burden (Bluth 2000). According to Bluth (*ibid.*), there are three reasons why Germany suggested the creation of a European pillar of NATO: (1) to convince the United States that the Europeans were serious about making their own defense contributions; (2) to permit the consideration of European interests on a collective basis, in case they are different from those of the United States; and (3) to enable France to be drawn into a framework of European security that was outside NATO but not in contradiction to alliance commitments and objectives.

Although the United States has been a great supporter of European defense in principle, it was nevertheless suspicious of a European Union that might detract from U.S. leadership in NATO (Hyde-Price 2000). Developments in 2002 and 2003, before the Iraq War, might be given as examples supporting such suspicions.

The next step in creating a European defense mechanism was to establish Franco-German brigades called Eurocorps, created in 1992. How Eurocorps is connected to NATO, the WEU, or the United Nations is left ambiguous, because France and Germany could not agree on the use of force outside of the NATO agreement. While Germany defended the necessity of UN legitimacy, France argued that a UN mandate means the use of Eurocorps by non-Europeans. The compromise suggested that the corps would be used in missions supported by the United Nations wherever member European nations approved. The mission of the Eurocorps was defined as such: (1) The Eurocorps is to be prepared to carry out humanitarian aid missions and population assistance missions following a natural or technical disaster. (2) It can also be made available for peace-restoring or peacekeeping missions, for example within the scope of the United Nations Organization (UNO) or the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). (3) The Eurocorps can be employed as well as a mechanized army corps in high-intensity combat operations, in order to ensure the common defense of the Allies in application of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty (NATO), or of the Brussels Treaty (WEU) (Eurocorps website).

British and U.S. reactions to the establishment of a German-French military unit were not quite positive. The U.S. ad-

ministration at the time expressed explicit concerns that prevented other NATO-WEU members from participating in Eurocorps. Today there are only Belgium, Luxembourg, and Spain participating, in addition to the original two. However, according to some explanations, the Eurocorps project is still a success for Germany: It provides an international framework in which the constitutional and political limitations of German participation in "out-of-area" missions can be gradually overcome by becoming locked in a network of commitments. Also, it draws France closer to NATO (Bluth 2000). Although there are inherent contradictions and weak arrangements, the establishment of Eurocorps is an important step for the institutional design that Germany aspires to establish.

The following very significant step in establishing a common security and defense policy was the Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. Germany has made great efforts to ensure the future consolidation of the defense policy. The Amsterdam Treaty states that the EU can examine all aspects of foreign and security policy. Also, closer links with the WEU are articulated, such as the possibility of an EU-WEU merger, and the EU can avail itself of the WEU on defense matters (Forster and Wallace 2000). This could be a real revolution for the EU and its CFSP and CDP, if the German way of ambitious implementation were taken. Defense could be the fourth pillar of the union. However, because of British opposition to an enhanced and clearer definition of the relations between the EU and the WEU—the United Kingdom obviously wants those two institutions to be separate—the vague nature of the defense policy remains a problem today. Although the treaty clearly refers to the possibility

of an EU-WEU merger, the careful language of the treaty document reveals the disagreeing views of the members on the issue. The biggest obstacle to further consolidation of a CDP is the lack of support for the German approach. Although Germany is willing to take the leadership role in creation of the CDP, only Benelux countries supported the merger of EU and WEU. Even France was in favor of a more intergovernmentalist approach.

However, the Labor Party government in Britain has slightly eased the conflict between Germany and the United Kingdom in terms of defense policy. In 1998, Tony Blair indicated that he will no longer oppose European military cooperation, provided that it does not hurt relations with the United States. Finally, the Nice Treaty, which entered into force on February 1, 2003, contains amendments that reflect the operative development of the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) as an independent EU project, and as such it achieves another step for the European defense project (Federal Foreign Office).

The situation between Germany/France and the United States/United Kingdom worsened at the peak of the Iraq crisis in early 2003. Germany and France sought for international legitimacy by UN resolutions, while the United States and the United Kingdom insisted on a military intervention even without a UN resolution. In April of the same year, France and Germany, with Belgium and Luxembourg, proposed that the EU have its own military planning headquarters, situated in the village of Tervuren, just outside Brussels. In addition, the EU constitution, which was planned to be finished by the end of 2003, would include a mutual defense clause. Britain, although not against the European defense idea in principle,

expressed its concerns about how this would affect transatlantic relations, especially after such a crisis in early 2003. The draft wording of the EU constitution clause states: "If a member state is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other member states shall give it aid and assistance by all the means in their power, military or other, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter" (Roxburgh 2003).

But the British insist that the clause should clearly include the fact that commitment in this area shall be consistent with commitments under NATO, which, for those states that are members, remains the foundation of their collective defense (ibid.). The December 2003 EU summit ended in failure, without producing a constitutional document.

The conclusion we can draw from this review is, currently, that as yet there is no institution or treaty providing European defense. Thus the future of the European alliance is ambiguous. There are treaties and attempts to create tangible assets, such as Eurocorps, yet the German push for a solid approach to European defense is far from being accomplished.

Thus, in crisis times, the EU reaction is not, and will not likely be, consistent. Many critics refer to the different responses of the EU members to the Yugoslav crisis in the 1990s and to the Iraq War in 2003 as evidence of the EU's inability to develop foreign and defense policies in times of crisis. The EU responses to such crises are ad hoc.

The German approach to security and defense problems, and the recent cooperation with France, seem to be hopeful for the future of the EU. Such a huge economic and social integration cannot be thought of without a mechanism for defense. The best way to achieve a common

defense policy is to create institutions which recognize that the cooperation of the United States and integration of NATO are vitally important. Although the Franco-German pact seems to acknowledge that fact, in practice they have not yet induced enough U.S. support. The future of European defense depends on assuring the United States that CDP is not against NATO and U.S. interests in Europe.

Size and Structure of the Military

The peacetime strength of the Bundeswehr is some 284,500 personnel, including 94,500 conscripts. The reserve figures are more impressive, with some 358,650 men raising Germany's wartime strength to around 640,000 (*Military Balance 2003–2004*). The army counts 191,350, the navy 25,650, and the air force 67,500 men. The German armed forces are divided into three categories: (1) Basic Military Organization (BMO), which includes the military installations necessary for peacetime command, administration, support, and training; (2) Main Defense Forces (MDF), the backbone of national and alliance defense; and (3) Reaction Forces (RF), with a strength of 50,000 military personnel, which are Germany's readily available contribution to NATO, the WEU, and international military peace standards (Goebel 1999).

In terms of main weapon systems, Germany has modern capabilities by world standards. Germany is not a nuclear power, but the conventional weapon systems of Germany are among the best in the world, even when compared with those of the United States. Major procurement programs of the last couple of years have included Panzerhaubitze 2000 howitzers, Tiger attack helicopters, Eu-

rofighter planes, and U212 submarines, which are all modern conventional platforms. A new command and control system is being introduced to the Bundeswehr, along with the latest information technology-related policies, such as digitalization of the battlefield (ibid.). The Bundeswehr has always been a conscript army, and both the government and public support conscription. According to a survey, two-thirds of Germans wish to keep conscription, on the grounds that it satisfies political and social needs. One of the most important reasons is the fear of the extreme militarism of the past: Germans believe that professional armies are less likely to be controlled by civilian authorities (Fleckenstein 2000).

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the German army has faced a series of challenges: the unification of East and West Germany; the imperative to absorb the East German People's Army (NPA); and calls for German out-of-area deployment in crisis areas. In many ways, the Bundeswehr has managed to overcome those difficulties. Yet perhaps the biggest challenge has been how to reform and restructure itself to deal with these tasks (Sarotte 2001).

In the first years of this great transformation, Germany also had to (1) reduce the size of its military from some 600,000 personnel (Bundeswehr and NPA) to 370,000 by 1994; (2) reduce military matériel and equipment on a large scale under the CFE (1990 Treaty on Conventional Arms in Europe); (3) contribute to the German National Program of Unity by establishing new army units in the new German states; and (4) integrate former NVA soldiers into the Bundeswehr (Goebel 1999).

Germany has successfully pursued those policies. However, perhaps the

more difficult policy to pursue was participating in the international military actions that the international community pressured Germany into. Having assumed full sovereignty, being a member of the United Nations, and also being one of the richest countries in the world, Germany was expected by its allies in Europe and NATO to participate more actively in international security missions. The problem was that, following two world wars, the Bundeswehr had been designed not to use force abroad. Parliamentary control of the military was firmly established, and noninterventionism was the basic policy of Germany.

Being under such pressures—and especially with regional security concerns such as the Yugoslav War in the 1990s—German policymakers came to the conclusion that they needed to take a more active stand in terms of contributing to NATO, WEU, and UN missions. The German public was prepared for this new role, and in July 1994 the German Constitutional Court ruled that there was no constitutional bar to the use of German armed forces abroad (Sarotte 2001). Step by step, Germany has become more involved in these operations. Bundeswehr personnel participated in various UN missions. In 1992–1993, the Bundeswehr assisted the UN hospitals in Cambodia; in 1992–1994, a force of 1,800 joined the UN in Somalia. German air forces took part in the disarmament of Iraq in 1993–1995 and as a part of NATO mission in *Operation Deny Flight* over Bosnia. In Kosovo, despite the public disapproval of sending ground forces to such a sensitive area, Germany contributed 8,000 soldiers to the *Operation Allied Force* (ibid.). In Kosovo in March 1999, the German military participated in a combat mission for the first time since World War II (CNN).

Currently, German forces contribute significantly to international missions. With some 7,000 personnel participating in multinational missions around the world, Germany is the second largest contributor after the United States. The current deployment of German forces in the world is as follows, as of February 2004: ISAF (International Security Assistance Force), Afghanistan, Uzbekistan: 2,000; KFOR (Kosovo Force): 3,200; SFOR (Stabilization Force), Bosnia and Herzegovina: 1,350; NATO HQ Skopje, Macedonia: 12; UNOMIG (UN Mission in Georgia): 11; Enduring Freedom (Anti-Terror Mission, Horn of Africa): 450; UNMEE (UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea): 2. Together with soldiers on standby in Germany for possible MEDEVAC missions and the naval units in parts of the Mediterranean Sea (Active Endeavour), the total number of Bundeswehr soldiers deployed on missions abroad is about 7,250 (German Ministry of Defense).

As a result of these developments over the last thirteen years, the definition of the major mission and tasks of the Bundeswehr has changed. According to German policymakers, the military in the future must have the following capabilities: (1) to defend Germany and its allies as part of the NATO alliance in NATO operations; (2) to provide military support within NATO, for collective defense or within the crisis management framework through NATO or WEU; (3) to participate in international crisis management and conflict prevention; (4) to help in disaster relief, search and rescue operations, and humanitarian activities (Fleckenstein 2000); (5) to serve world peace and international security in accordance with the UN charter; and (6) to promote military stability and European integration (Goebel 1999).

Budget

The difficulties that the German economy has been experiencing in the last couple of years are reflected in defense spending patterns. Germany announced in 2002 that the defense budget will remain fixed at Å24.4 billion until 2006. In 2003, research and development received Å965 million, up from Å851 million in 2002. Procurement funds rose from Å3.5 billion to Å4 billion in the same period. The *Military Balance 2003–2004* claims that although there are extra funds for research and development and procurement in 2003, several programs have been cut as the 2008 procurement bow wave approaches. In addition to these many procurement savings, the defense ministry is reviewing all its operational costs to decrease nonprocurement spending. That may result in some cuts in training and domestic deployments (*Military Balance 2003–2004*). Some detailed information on German defense spending is provided in Table 2.

The transformation that the German Army has gone through is reflected in defense spending issues as well. Since the end of the Cold War, the defense spending of Germany has constantly decreased, in both nominal and relative terms (see Table 2). Although that was the case for major European powers such as the United Kingdom and France as well, there has been growing criticism against Germany for not spending "enough" on defense. For example, Germany spent U.S.\$32.4 billion in 1993, U.S.\$28.1 billion in 1998, and U.S.\$27.7 billion in the year 2002. In percentage of GDP, German defense spending in 1993 was 1.9 percent and only 1.6 percent in 1998 and 2002 (*SIPRI Yearbook 2003*). In both measures there is a certain decline in defense spending.

Table 2 German Military Expenditure by Personnel and Equipment, 1993–2002

	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002
Personnel	19,247	18,370	18,319	18,090	17,607	17,230	17,188	17,078	16,619	16,679
Personnel Change	-8.9	-4.6	-0.3	-1.3	-2.7	-2.1	-0.3	-0.6	-2.7	0.4
Equipment	3,597	3,293	3,383	3,232	3,023	3,575	3,794	3,804	3,865	3,380
Equipment Change	-25.0	-8.4	2.7	-4.5	-6.5	18.3	6.1	0.2	1.6	-12.6

The figures in Table 2 are U.S. dollars (millions) at 2000 prices and exchange rates. The change figures represent the changes from the previous year.

Source

Skönks, Elisabeth, and Petter Stålenheim. 2003. "Appendix 10C: Sources and Methods for Military Expenditure Data." In *SIPRI Yearbook 2003: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security*. London: Oxford University Press.

We observe a decrease in British and French spending in both constant U.S. dollar terms and percentage of GDP. France's military expenditure steadily decreased from U.S.\$37.2 billion in 1993 to U.S.\$33.5 in 2002; in terms of percentage of GDP, the figures changed from 3.3 percent in 1993 to 2.5 in 2001. For the United Kingdom in the same period, the change was from U.S.\$41.6 to U.S.\$36 billion and from 3.5 percent to 2.5 percent of GDP. This trend has actually been the case for many developed countries following the Cold War. In the United States, for example, a similar trend has been observed: in terms of dollars spent, the 1993 figure was \$354 billion; toward the end of the decade spending decreased to as low as \$289 billion by 1998. However, after 9–11 and with wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, defense spending increased significantly to \$335 billion in 2002. Defense spending was expected to be \$419.3 billion in 2006. In terms of percentage of GDP, the U.S. example shows similarities; spending steadily decreased from 4.5 percent in 1993 to 3.1 percent in 2001 (ibid.).

Although the data from the United Kingdom, France, and the United States

show a stable decrease in defense spending, Germany is being criticized for spending the least among these developed countries. However, Gerhard Schröder's security advisors do not agree with such criticisms about German defense spending. They argue that these figures are misleading because so-called defense spending is calculated differently in these countries. For example, the French budget includes "gendarmerie," but the German defense budget does not include that expense. Also, the German government claims that spending which has security implications but is not included in the defense budget—that is, German aid to East Germany and the former Soviet Union for the withdrawal of their forces from the east—should be taken by the Allies as significant contributions to European security (Sarotte 2001).

Presenting all of these examples, Germany denies that its military spending is lower than that of other major powers of Europe. On the contrary, the German government claims that the issues on which Germany prefers to spend are more important in terms of collective European security.

In terms of international arms transfers, Germany is one of the main suppliers. In the 1998–2003 period, Germany accounted for 5 percent of international arms deliveries. After increasing its deliveries slightly in 2002, Germany became the fifth largest arms supplier in the world. Germany's main recipients are Turkey and Israel (*SIPRI Yearbook 2003*).

Civil-Military Relations/The Role of the Military in Domestic Politics

Until the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949, the German Army had enjoyed autonomy in German society. Parliamentary, or democratic, control of the army was not always achieved. However, the crimes in which the German armed forces participated during World War II led civil authorities to establish full democratic control over the military.

The image of the Bundeswehr in German society today is quite positive. The armed forces are one of the most respected institutions of Germany (Fleckenstein 2000). Parliamentary control over the Bundeswehr and its loyalty to democracy were established in the Basic Law of 1949. The military accepts its position in the democratic system as well, and is responsible to the federal defense minister.

It was not easy for the German society to define its relationship with the Bundeswehr, because of the armed forces' promotion of war and involvement in the Holocaust during World War II (see Sidebar 1). The need for a break with the past was manifest; thus, the society engaged in pacifism. Under these circumstances it was not easy for the Federal Republic to find personnel for the new army. The famous "without me" movement is a clear example of German men's reluctance to join the army. The federal gov-

ernment overcame these problems by introducing new concepts about army services and corporate arrangements. The concept of *Innere Führung* is one of those concepts, meaning that soldiers have fundamental rights protected by the constitution and international human rights standards. *Innere Führung* entails the right of the soldier to oppose orders that violate the Basic Law and international human rights codex. Conscientious objection is also an option for German men (Kümmel 2001). All of these arrange-

Sidebar 1 The Holocaust Memorial

A memorial for the victims of the holocaust that was committed by the Nazi dictatorship during World War II is located within walking distance from the Brandenburg Gate in the city center of Berlin. After a decade of discussion, the design created by American architect Peter Eisenman was approved by the German parliament and construction began in 2001. The memorial sits on a 19,000-square-meter open area on which 2,700 concrete steel blocks were erected. The gray steel blocks measure five meters in height and weigh several tons. Eisenman said the site is intended to be a confrontation with the past and that the design should give the impression of an "undulating field." The architect stated the uneven ground and the varying heights of the blocks are designed to create the sense of insecurity, but not overwhelming loss. The memorial was opened May 10, 2005.

Source

Deutsche Welle. "Berlin Holocaust Memorial Takes Shape," 17 August 2003. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,949359,00.html> [accessed May 18, 2005].

ments and the Soviet threat led German society to believe that the Bundeswehr and conscription are necessary institutions of democracy.

Present civil-military relations in Germany are far from being conflictual. In Germany, the democratic control of the armed forces is complete, and there is no threat of state coup from the Bundeswehr. The mild problems are usually about the defense budget, conscription, or using the Bundeswehr in international missions.

In terms of conscription policy (see Sidebar 2), the majority of Germans still believe it to be necessary, but young people usually subscribe to the "Yes to Bundeswehr but without me" philosophy. Conscientious objectors still remain strong in the society. As to the unification of the Bundeswehr and GDR's National People's Army (NPA), although downsizing and layoffs caused problems—that is, the reaction against the West in the East—it is possible to say that Germany has achieved the great task successfully.

Finally, the use of the German military in foreign crises was an important question at the beginning of 1990s. German constitutional courts in 1994 confirmed the government's interpretation that the Basic Law does not ban such external use of force. Today there is little opposition in Germany about the use of reaction forces with UN mandate—that is, in Afghanistan or Kosovo. In terms of women and homosexuals in the Bundeswehr, there is not a substantial conflict between the society and the politicians. In terms of recruitment to the army, neither women's associations nor homosexual interest groups exert pressure on politicians to alter the existing practices. The German public is uninterested in women's involvement on ac-

Sidebar 2 The German Army

The German army has been a conscript army since the country was unified by Bismarck in 1870. Generally, the public opinion in Germany has been in favor of this policy for various reasons, particularly because the army's involvement in the World War II atrocities made Germans believe that a professional army can be dangerous for the democracy and for the protection of human rights. In the last couple of years, however, a heated debate about abolishing conscription has begun in the government.

The ruling Social Democrat Party recognizes that switching to a professional army, like those found in other NATO countries, might be a better option than the current policy. The Green Party, the smaller partner of the coalition, has long pushed for the elimination of the existing nine-month conscription. German Defense Minister Peter Struck repeatedly has rejected the calls, however, arguing that Germany cannot have a professional army before 2010, mainly because of the German forces committed to international missions and the recent reductions in the number of soldiers serving. The government was expected to reach a final decision on the issue in 2005.

Source

Deutsche Welle. 2004. "Will Germany Abolish the Draft?" May 6. <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,1564,1191774,00.html> (accessed May 18, 2005).

count of the sexual harassment of women in other countries' armies, while homosexual men seem to be avoiding the armed forces (Fleckenstein 2000).

Terrorism

Germany suffered from terrorist activities in the 1968–1977 period. The student movements of 1968 led to the emergence of some left-wing terrorist organizations. The Baader-Meinhoff Gang, which also called itself the Red Army Faction (RAF), the Movement 2 June, and Revolutionary Cells (RZ), had some hundred members. Leaders of the RAF—Andreas Baader, Ulrike Meinhoff, and Gudrun Ensslin—who launched the most terrifying era in postwar German history, were captured in 1972. Their followers continued terrorist activities, such as the kidnapping and killing of people, to force the government to release the leaders of the RAF. However, the German government did not appease the terrorists. It was alleged by the German authorities that all three leaders of the RAF and Jan-Carl Raspe—another RAF member—committed suicide in prison on October 17, 1977. Although it was hoped this would end the terror of radical left-wing groups in Germany, the kidnappings and killings continued (Germanculture website). Only in March 1998 was the RAF officially disbanded. Yet German authorities continue to search for several RAF members (Patterns of Global Terrorism 1999).

Authorities in Germany have no evidence of organized, politically motivated right-wing terrorism in the country. With the increase of the foreign population in Germany during the 1990s, however, there were a number of so-called neo-Nazi attacks on minorities. Both at the federal and state level, successful efforts are taken to deal with xenophobic violence (ibid.).

Immediately after the September 11 attacks, the German government announced “unreserved solidarity” with the United States. The German government

is in full cooperation with the U.S. government in the war against terrorism. During 2002, Germany played an important role in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and the UN’s International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. In addition to security-related contributions, Germany also is taking a role in the reconstruction of Afghanistan and humanitarian aid to that country (ibid., 2002).

Since September 11, the government has been taking a harder line against the terrorist organizations operating in Germany. Many al-Qaeda-related terrorists have been captured in the last three years. These efforts are aided by the new legal arrangements introduced by the German state (ibid.).

Overall, Germany does not have a substantial terrorism problem, or terrorist organizations fighting specifically against the German government or people. Terrorist groups—that is, radical Islamist organizations, or the PKK (Kurdish Worker’s Party)—operate in Germany, but their main targets are different. Nevertheless, Germany has begun to take more effective measures against these organizations in the last few years.

Relationship with the United States

German-U.S. relations after World War II have been cooperative. Having fought against each other in two world wars, the countries founded their relations on bilateral collaboration over many issues.

After the unconditional surrender in 1945, Germany was occupied by the victorious Allies; disarming, demilitarizing, de-Nazifying, and democratizing Germany were the main objectives of the Allies. However, there were disagreements among the Allies over how to administer Germany—especially on economic and

political issues. These disagreements were the principal causes of the Cold War. With the increase of tension between East and West, the United States began a more supportive policy toward the Federal Republic. The Marshall Plan, initiated in 1947, helped the European nations to revive their economies, especially Germany, which was devastated by the war. In 1948, against the Soviet Union's Berlin Blockade, the United States provided 2.2 million people of Berlin with necessary supplies (see Sidebar 3). In 1954 the Federal Republic was invited to join NATO by members in the Paris Conference, and since 1955, Germany has been a NATO member. President J. F. Kennedy's visit to Berlin in 1963 and U.S. support for Germany's membership in the United Nations in 1973 and G-7 meetings since 1975 are other highlights of German-U.S. cooperation during the Cold War (German Embassy to Washington, D.C.).

The beginning of the 1990s witnessed even closer relations between Germany and the United States. With the fall of the Berlin Wall and changing Soviet policy, the unification of East and West Germany had become possible. On this vital matter the United States was the biggest supporter of Germany. Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush were the prime advocates of the unification, and the close cooperation continued during the Clinton administration as well. Especially on the question of the expansion of NATO, Germany and the United States consulted with each other and provided a fairly coherent policy on the matter. President Clinton and Chancellor Helmut Kohl agreed on both NATO expansion and EU-U.S. relations (Cox 1995).

The most important disagreement affecting German-U.S. relations today is related to the European Security and De-

Sidebar 3 The Berlin Airlift

The Berlin Airlift was one of the first and most important crises of the Cold War. Following World War II, Berlin was divided into four sectors that were controlled by the victorious powers. The city was surrounded by the Soviet occupation zone and, thus, the American, British, and French zones of Berlin did not have borders with their occupation zones in western Germany. As the disagreements among the Allies over the future of Germany and Berlin worsened, the USSR suspended all ground travel in and out of Berlin on 24 June 1948. On 26 June, the United States, followed by the British and French, launched a massive airlift to Berlin mainly providing coal, food, and other supplies. The USSR's blockade was lifted on 12 May, 1949, although the airlift continued until September 30. In thirteen months, the Western powers supplied Berlin with more than 2 million tons of goods. During the operation, an aircraft landed in Berlin every ninety seconds.

Source

USAF. <http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/history/postwwii/ba.htm> (accessed May 18, 2005).

fense Policy (ESDP). Germany is the biggest supporter of a pan-European defense system as an independent entity. Although German governments have been the leader of such an initiative, they have always stated that ESDP is not a substitute for NATO. However, it is not quite clear what direction a Franco/German-led European defense initiative will take, in terms of relations with NATO and the United States. The U.S. position is changing, too; although the United States has al-

ways announced its wish for European allies to take more responsibility on defense issues, there are certain suspicions from the U.S. side about the autonomy of such defense institution from NATO. These issues will perhaps become clearer as the EU proceeds to create a solid common security and defense policy.

It should be noted that there were significant disagreements over the Iraq War in 2003 between the United States and Germany. Germany, along with France, opposed unilateral action against Iraq. This was an example of emerging divergent views between Germany and the United States about the future of the world order. Although Germany has contributed significantly to the "War on Terrorism," the Bush doctrine of preemptive action does not seem to have support from the SPD-Green government.

German-U.S. trade relations are developing every year and are usually free of problems. To give an example, from 1997 to 2000, German exports to the United States increased from 76.6 to 119.8 billion deutsch marks (DM), and German imports increased from DM58.6 to DM90.9 billion (German Embassy to Washington, D.C.). Recent figures show similar trends: in the first quarter of 2003, U.S. imports from Germany were up by 17 percent compared with the same period of 2002, and U.S. exports were up by 10 percent. The same good economic relations are also observed in terms of investments: U.S. firms employ about 800,000 people in Germany, and German firms likewise employ about 800,000 people in the United States (U.S. Embassy to Germany).

The Future

Germany is perhaps the most important actor in terms of the defense and security

issues of Europe. Research suggests that the normalization of German security and foreign policies through multilateral institutions is the best strategy by which Germany can increase its influence in the international system. Thus, Germany implements such policies and gradually becomes the leader of the EU's security and defense issues. In the next decade, a more active German security and defense policy emphasizing the collective European security and defense institutions can be expected. Concerning these institutional arrangements, German policymakers should recognize that European security and defense are unfeasible without U.S. and NATO involvement. One way of facilitating the further development of CFSP and CDP is to clarify further the relations between institutions such as EU, WEU, and NATO, and to be sure to establish cooperative relations with the United States.

In terms of the defense budget, there is no expectation of change until 2006. After 2006, assuming that there will not be a different security threat than there is today, it would make sense to anticipate that the budget will be affected by the general condition of the German economy. If slow growth, public finance deficits, and unemployment continue, we can expect even lower defense spending. In a scenario in which the German economy revives, increased procurements, research and development spending for the Bundeswehr, and more funds for European defense can be expected to arise.

The security situation in Europe will probably be fairly peaceful in terms of interstate wars in the next decade, given that the current institutional arrangements and Russia's nonaggressive foreign policy will prevail. The greatest security threats in Europe may come from in-

trastate conflicts—that is, ethnic conflicts in the Balkans or Eastern Europe, and the possible spillover effects of such conflicts.

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