

## 1680–1747 OTTOMAN BUDGETS AND DEFICITS SUSTAINABILITY IN A PERIOD OF FISCAL TRANSITION: WARS AND ADMINISTRATIVE CHANGES

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### Abstract

This paper studies the sustainability of the Ottoman budget for the period from 1680 to 1747, during different sultanates and war eras. Moreover, we investigate whether the relationship between government revenues and expenditures changes in the period of *julus*. The empirical evidence gathered in this paper suggests that during the sample period, except for the sultanate era of Mahmut I, the Ottoman budget was not sustainable. The other interesting result of the study is that *julus* payments had a significant tax increasing effect. Moreover, the distribution of *julus* deteriorated the sustainability of budget.

*JEL classification:* N43, N45 and E62.

*Keywords:* Budget sustainability, Structural factors, Ottoman Empire.

### 1. Introduction

1680–1750 period was a transition period in Ottoman history. In the period of the Koprulus' grant vizierates, there were attempts to reinstate the system of traditional autocracy. However, these efforts were total failures in the war period of 1683–1699. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, local powers and provincial families increased, so the 18<sup>th</sup> century was a decentralisation interval for the Empire. After the siege of Vienna (1683), the period of *stagnation* closed and a period of *decline* started. The chief problems of the period were the budget deficit and its sustainability.

This paper examines the Empire's central budget deficit sustainability in

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period from 1680 to 1747. The data set obtained from Tabakoglu (1985)<sup>1</sup> is cash revenues and cash expenditures. The sources translated from an unknown language were Ottoman budget documents *ruznamche*<sup>2</sup> and budget books. According to the *ruznamches*, income and expenditure accounts expressed in local currency, the *Akche*. The aim of this study is to examine the deficit sustainability of the sultanate intervals and the various war periods during this transition era. Our estimates suggest that the budget deficit was not sustainable in either the sultanate eras or the war eras. The only exception is seen in the reign of Mahmut I, where the deficit was sustainable. When we sought the reasons for these estimation results, we found that there is a correlation between deficit sustainability and each of the following conditions: increased expenditures periods, payments made to *Janissaries* and policies applied by the sultans reigning during that period. This paper aims to enrich the academic literature on the Ottoman economy with the findings about budget deficit sustainability for the 1680–1747 period as well as for various sub-periods. Next section elaborates on government expenditures and revenue sustainability in the light of historical developments. Section 3 explains the econometric method used in this paper. The empirical evidence is presented in section 4 and section 5 concludes the study.

### Period and Financial Problems

Following the siege of Vienna in 1683, bureaucratic and military expenditures, particularly, increased. Following the defeat in Vienna, the war continued between Austria and the Ottomans. While the Ottoman army was fighting towards Edirne, permanent and temporary land losses occurred in the Balkan region as a result of the battles. In addition, after the 16<sup>th</sup> century, the share of central revenues in total revenues began to decrease. One of the main reasons for this was an increase in the defence expenditures of the state because castles on the borders required expenditures to fulfil their functions. In the mid-16<sup>th</sup> century, the central government had been able to control 58% of total revenues but in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, this amount retrogressed to 25%. As a result of these developments, approximately all of the revenues belonged to the sultan and

in war times, a large share of the sultans' revenues from Musul, Diyarbakir, Baghdad and Crete were spent in these provinces. Thus, the revenues of provinces not in the *timar* and *waqf* systems started to be discluded from the central budget accounts. The spending of revenues locally, the transfer of Egypt's waybill into the internal treasury and the assignment of some revenues to the personal treasury of the wives of sultans limited the financial area controlled by the budget of the central government. It can be seen that the Ottoman financial and budgetary system in the period between 1680 and 1747 exhibited a limited central and extended local characteristic as a result of the reasons given above.

Especially as a result of late *mevacip* and *julus* payments to the *Janissaries* and the discontent due to defeats, there were a threat of a military revolt in the capital, Istanbul. The uneasiness caused by army based financial problems came to light with breaking out of three military revolts during the period from 1680 to 1747. These events shook the roots of the Empire and resulted in the dethroning of Mehmet IV in 1687, Mustafa II in 1703, and Ahmet III in 1730<sup>3</sup>. The jumps in expenditures for these dates and the deterioration of the central budget can be seen in Figure 1. In the 17<sup>th</sup> century, the *Jelali* revolts and wars with Iran led to a reduction in the population of Anatolia and accelerated migration to the cities. Parallel to these developments, agricultural production decreased and local governors, *Ayans*, gained power against the central government<sup>4,5</sup>.

### 3. Econometric Method

In order to assess the sustainability of the Ottoman budget, we estimate the following equations.

$$\text{Revenue}_t = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{Expenditures}_t + e_t \quad (1)$$

where  $\text{Revenue}_t$  is the logarithm of government tax revenues,  $\text{Expenditures}_t$  is the logarithm of government expenditures and  $e_t$  is the residual term at time  $t$ .  $\alpha_0$  and  $\alpha_1$  are the parameters of interest. In this paper, we also examined how the relationship between  $\text{Revenue}_t$  and  $\text{Expenditures}_t$  is affected by various factors such as different sultanates, different war periods and *julus* payment periods. In order to account for

rs, we also included dummy variables ( $D_t$ ) into the analysis Equation 2.

$$\beta_0 + \beta_1 D_t + \beta_2 \text{Expenditures}_t + \beta_3 \text{Expenditures}_t * D_t + e_t \quad (2)$$

Variables used in this study are for each sultanate, *war* and *julus*. When the particular condition is present, the dummy variable ( $D_t$ ) value of 1 and zero otherwise. When the parameters of estimates are estimated, the autonomous revenue will be  $\beta_0 + \beta_1$  if the condition is met (1) and  $\beta_0$  if the condition is not met ( $D_t = 0$ ). Similarly, the revenue will be  $\beta_2 + \beta_3$ , if the condition is met and  $\beta_2$  if the condition is not met<sup>6</sup>. It is also important to note that government revenue is not an exogenous variable but is affected by various factors, such as government's revenues. Hence, performing least squares regression will give us biased estimates. In this paper, the Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Method is used to address this problem. When the data are gathered, we used two-lag values of  $\text{Expenditures}_{t-1}$ ,  $\text{Expenditures}_{t-2}$  as instruments.

## Empirical Evidence

To analyse the budget sustainability, we used monthly data from 1680 to 1747 in the Hicri calendar, which is a calendar based on the moon and lasts 354 days. The data, including cash revenue and expenditures of the Ottoman central budget, is gathered from Tabakoglu (1991) sources are translated from the Ottoman language. The basic data were Ottoman budget documents, *ruznamche*, and government yearbooks recorded in the local currency, the *Akche*.

To examine the sustainability of the budget deficit for the sample period, we need to consider three different factors as sources of possible deterioration of budget sustainability. These are differences in revenue and expenditures over periods, and *julus* payments. Regression results examining these factors are summarised in Tables 1 to 6. Table 1 reports the deficit analysis for the full sample as well as for the reign of each sultan. Tables 2 and 3 represent the results of the analysis in the specific periods of this period and Table 4 reports the estimates for the Iranian

war era but it also considers Mahmut I's sultanate during this war era. Table 5 gives the estimate of the testable model for the times of *julus* payments. The last table, Table 6, reports all these estimates with a Revenue-Expenditures ratio rather than with a  $\text{Expenditures}_t$  and  $\text{Revenue}_t$  used in Tables 1-5. In these Tables, parameter estimates are reported in the first row and *t-values* are written in parentheses.

Table 1: Revenues-Expenditures Relationship for Each Sultan.

Sultanate	Constant	Expenditures	SSR
<b>Full Sample (1680-1747)</b>	1.712*	0.921	1203.5
	(0.773)	(7.182)	
<b>Mehmet IV (1648-1687)</b>	18.653**	-0.093	89.417
	(2.12)	(-0.179)	
<b>Suleyman II (1687-1691)</b>	8.988**	0.479	50.383
	(1.814)	(1.656)	
<b>Ahmet II (1691-1695)</b>	9.63**	0.433	51.533
	(1.658)	(1.262)	
<b>Mustafa II (1695-1703)</b>	8.57**	0.521	77.804
	(1.675)	(1.739)	
<b>Ahmet III (1703-1730)</b>	7.475**	0.594	344.503
	(2.194)	(2.984)	
<b>Mahmut I (1730-1754)</b>	-10.887**	1.628*	693.057
	(-0.643)	(1.717)	

Note: \* Indicates a significance level of 10%.

\*\* Indicates a significance level of 5%.

*t*-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated coefficients.

If the estimated coefficient of  $\text{Expenditures}_t$  is less than 1, this suggests that a government continues to spend more than it collects, we took this indication as a risk of default in the long run. For this reason, the interest rate that the government has to offer to service its debt would be higher. Hakkio and Rush (1991) note the necessity that the coefficient of expenditures be equal to one for the sovereignty of the debt, which also implies a balanced budget. While evaluating results of the analysis, our criterion is that if the coefficient is less than one, then the deficit is unsustainable; if it is greater than or equal to one, then the deficit is

able. In economic literature, it is prescribed that when the growth of a budget deficit is less than or equal to the growth rate of the economy, then the deficit is sustainable. However, we cannot consider the economy in this study because we lack growth rate data for this period of the Ottoman economy. For this reason, the criterion mentioned above is used in this study as the indicator of deficit sustainability. One may also argue that using just the slope coefficient while ignoring the constant term may not show the sustainability of the deficit properly. Autonomous revenue (the revenue captured by a constant term) shows the revenue not depending on economic activities. If the Keynesian theory is right, then expenditures stimulate economic growth, so the tax revenues will increase under a flat or progressive tax system. Thus, autonomous taxation depends on various factors, such as population, but it does not depend on economic performance. In the long run, the role of autonomous taxation will decrease and the budget will not be sustainable if the slope coefficient is less than one.

The results of the analysis are summarised in Tables 1–5. In Table 1, the sustainability conditions in 1680–1747 period of the full sample and by sultan are reported. In the sample period, there were six reigning sultans in the Empire: Mehmet IV (1648–1687), Suleyman II (1687–1691), Mustafa II (1691–1695), Mustafa II (1695–1703), Ahmet III (1703–1730), and Mustafa I (1730–1754). For the full sample, the coefficient of expenditures is less than 1 (0.921), which means that the budget deficit was unsustainable. In the regression equation, the constant term accounts for autonomous taxation, which usually is not for efficient allocation but for fixed and per head taxes. In the regression equation, the constant represents the autonomous taxation and this coefficient is less than 1 for the full sample, which is a small coefficient compared to the other periods. To understand the use of taxes to finance the increased expenditures, the information below will be helpful.

When the full sample is considered, the considerable changes and administrative difficulties either in the provinces or in the central government are seen. The expenditures of local revenues locally and centrally limited the financial sources of the central budget, and sultans' efforts to Edirne because of the fear of revolt created an administrative and economic struggle in the capital. Sharply increased expenditures led sultans to find new sources of finance. In different periods of the sample, different taxes were levied. However, finding new sources was not enough to


cover the speed of the increase in expenditures (see Figure 1). The increasing cash need led the central government in the time of Mehmet IV to levy a new tax named "*imdadıyye*". Initially, this tax was collected to finance military expenditures in urgent times and in long lasting war periods, but within a few decades it had become a regular tax collected in different amounts in either war or peace time. The grand vizier of Suleyman II, Kopruluzade Fazil Mustafa Pasha (1689), tried to reform the tax system during his short administration. The other type of taxes levied in extraordinary cases was "*avariz akcesi*". After 1683, these taxes became regular items in the central budget as well. Thus, it can be seen that sultans had a strong tendency to increase autonomous taxes to finance the increasing cash needs, but from time-to-time some governors tried reforms to decrease the tax burden on taxpayers. For instance, in 1689–1691, Koprulu Fazil Ahmet Pasha's period, the revenues exceeded expenditures (see Figure 1). In the sultanate of Ahmet III, especially the Tulip Period of 1706–1729, sometimes there were excess revenues because of the peace policies and different applications of the sultan.

We elaborated on the idea that budget sustainability could be different for each sultan and each war era. The deficit sustainability indicator of the equation, the coefficient of *Expenditures<sub>t</sub>*, is less than 1 for all of the six sultans in Table 1, except Mahmut I (1730–1754) and for all of the three intervals in Table 2 except the Ottoman–Iran War (1723–1746). Hence, we perform the regression analysis for each sultan and each war era. The results reported in Table 1 indicate that in the sultanates of five sultans, the budget deficit was unsustainable. The lowest coefficient is –0.093 for the time of Mehmet IV. His reign was the beginning at the big land losses after the defeat of Vienna. There was also administrative uncertainty during this interval. He was six years old when he became the sultan. His reign was full of political and military problems. For instance, the first years of the Sultan passed under the strong domination of his mother Kosem Sultan. The power of the central government both in the capital and in the provinces weakened. The *Janissaries*' were in control in Istanbul and Jelali pashas' control led the provinces. The other times when the coefficients of *Expenditures<sub>t</sub>* were less than 1 are: Suleyman II, 0.479; Ahmet II, 0.433; Mustafa II, 0.521; and Ahmet III, 0.594. During these periods, war expenditures were a big item in the central budget. During these reigns of

e sultans of the sample period, these costly wars continued. In the tanate of Suleyman II, the fight against Austrians continued in the lkan region and the Russia attacked to the Crimea. In the time of ustafa II, there was a big defeat in Zenta. In the time of Ahmet III, wars th Austria on land and with Venice at sea continued, and there were also cupations of Iran in Azerbaijan and Hemedan. Besides the great financial rdens of the wars, there were *Janissary* revolts either in the capital or in melia for *julus* and other payments. As seen in Table 1, the highest efficient among the coefficients of expenditures less than one, 0.594, is in e sultanate of Ahmet III. The peace policy of Ahmet III in his relations th the other states can be mentioned as an important reason for the gher coefficient. The only coefficient of expenditures greater than 1 is the eefficient of Mahmut I's reign. In his time, wars with Iran in the east, with ustria in the west, and with Russia in the north were generally successful: e Belgrade Treaty with Russia and Austria (1739), the Hemedan Treaty id treaty after the Musul War (1746) with Iran. All of these treaties eemed advantageous for Ottomans. There was no military revolt in his lltanate. The *Constant* in Table 1 represents the autonomous taxes. For ie full sample autonomous taxation has a positive coefficient. The 580–1747 sample was a continuous war period and to finance these wars, ie central administration levied extraordinary taxes (*Avariz*, *Nuzul* and *ursat*), which became regular in a short time. Three important sources of :venue were *mukataa*, *jizya* and *avariz*. The highest revenues collected om *mukataa* were at the beginning and end of the period because in etween war periods led to decreased *mukataa* revenues. *Jizya* revenues ere increased in the time of the tax reforms of Kopruluzade Fazil Mustafa ashah in the 1690s. In the 1683–1700 interval, *jizya* was collected in dvance (generally one year). In the last years of the sample period, *jizya* evenue retrogressed. The extraordinary tax *Avariz* was increased in war imes and decreased in peace times. These movements in taxes can be ollowed in Figure 1. When we consider all the sultans, the highest utoonomous tax was in the sultanate of Mehmet IV, 18.653. After the ienna siege, temporary or permanent loss of land led to a decrease in *mukataa* revenues. In the time of Suleymen II, copper coin usage changed he exchange rate of foreign currencies. Then, expectations of instability in he market, *Hasses* of the Sultan and *mukataas* were removed from the

*iltizam* system but in this period the tendency for autonomous taxation was not as high as for Mehmet IV, only 8.988. In the sultanate of Ahmet II, we saw the tax reform of the Kopruluzade Fazil Ahmet Pasha. To be able to increase tax revenues, *jizya* (collected from each household) started to be collected per head, as in the past. In this new system, the criterion was the ability to pay<sup>7</sup>. After these sultanates, autonomous taxation started to decrease (Table 1) because from time to time treaties like the Karlowitz Treaty (1699) and the treaty with Russia (1700) were made. In the peace periods, disorders in the *mukataa* system were dealt with and revenues from *mukataas* increased, which meant a decrease in the amount of extraordinary taxes. The people living in Tamishvar, Belgrad, and Bosnia were exempted from *jizya* taxes in 1699–1700<sup>8</sup>. All these seem to be effective autonomous taxes in the sultanate of Ahmet III. F-test results for the analysis are 6.44 for the full sample period. This value of the F-statistics reject the null hypothesis that all the sultanate periods were the same. It can be interpreted that sultans applied different policies in their reigns and each sultan had different characteristics in his time interval.

Figure 1: Revenue and Expenditures of the Ottoman Budget in Logarithms (1680–1747)<sup>9</sup>.



## : Revenues-Expenditures Relationship Across Different War Periods.

Period	Constant	Expenditures	SSR
Vienna to Karlowitz (1683-1699)	6.576** (1.502)	0.622 (2.428)	214.214
Karlowitz to Pasarowitz (1699-1718)	5.855** (1.742)	0.683 (3.462)	306.100
Ottoman-Iran War (1723-1746)	-0.619 (-0.106)	1.055* (3.206)	421.711

Indicates a significance level of 10%.

Indicates a significance level of 5%.

t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated coefficients.

The discussions above make clear, not the different sultanates but the different war periods were the reason for the fiscal policy action that was taken for the sustainability of budgets. The sample period is divided into three intervals: the Vienna Siege to Karlowitz (1683-1699), Karlowitz to Pasarowitz (1699-1718), and the Ottoman-Iran War (1723-1746). This division is based on main characteristics of the war periods. The first interval, Vienna Siege to Karlowitz (1683-1699), was a period of defeat and losses. The second period, Karlowitz to Pasarowitz (1699-1718), was a period of attempts to regain the lost lands, and the third interval was a successful war period in which new lands were gained in the east. After the Vienna siege, the central government levied a new tax, *imdadiyye*. Initially, this tax was collected to finance military expenditures in times of emergency and in long lasting war periods. However, in a few decades it became a regular tax collected in various amounts, even in peace periods. From the 1700 peace with Russia to the Ottoman victory in Prut. As in the previous period (1706-1729), sometimes there were even excess revenues (see Figure 1). When the war periods are considered in Table 2, in the three war periods, the coefficients of expenditures were less than 1: 0.622, 0.683 and 1.055. The period in which the coefficient of autonomous expenditures was below zero is the war period with Iran. There were some fiscal advantages of wars in the east, which can be mentioned as important reasons for the lower autonomous taxes. These advantages can be mentioned as follow. After defeats in the west, *Janissary* revolts started in

Rumelia, was easily extended to the capital, Istanbul. These revolts ended with either *julus* payment or other extraordinary payments made to the *Janissaries*, which affected the budget deficit sustainability negatively. On the other hand, for any war in the east, such a revolt extending to the capital was not possible. In addition to these, during the Iranian war period in the east, there were sizeable land gains, despite temporary and small land losses, which did not influence either *mukataa* revenues from the eastern provinces or any other revenues like *jizya* and *Avariz*. There were not any tax revenue problems in war times in the east. During these wars, in contrast to contrary to the western provinces, there were not any tax-exemptions or delays made by the central government. These are advantageous factors for budget deficit sustainability. The highest coefficient estimated for expenditures is the coefficient of the third war period, the Ottoman-Iran War (1723-1746) in the east, which is 1.055. When we examine the autonomous taxes in the three war periods, we see these coefficients for the three war periods: The estimated coefficients are for Vienna-Karlowitz (1683-1699), 6.576; for Karlowitz-Pasarowitz (1699-1718), 5.855; and for the Ottoman-Iran War (1723-1746), -0.619. Among these, the lowest coefficient for the autonomous taxes is -0.619 for the Ottoman-Iranian War period. This interval was a successful time for the Empire because besides victories, many peace treaties were made. In this time, wars with Iran, Austria, and Russia were generally successful. The Belgrade Treaty with Russia and Austria (1739), the Hemedan Treaty and the treaty after the Musul War (1746) with Iran seemed advantageous for the Empire. The impression gained from the analysis of the war periods is an unsustainable budget deficit that cannot be recovered or mitigated by the short-term deficit sustainability. Moreover, the three war periods exhibit different characteristics either from both other periods or from each other. The F-test values are 228.993 for the war periods in Table 2 and 294.6077 in Table 3, which are statistically significant.

Table 3 summarises the direct comparisons of deficit sustainability and autonomous taxation during war periods. In this regression  $D_t$  represents the war periods and  $D_t^* Expenditures_t$  represents the expenditures made in these war periods. It is understood from the estimated coefficients of  $Expenditures_t$  that expenditures decreased in all of the three war periods. Especially in the Karlowitz-Pasarowitz (1699-1718) period, the estimated coefficient for  $Expenditures_t$  retrogressed to a negative value, -0.177.

the Siege process, taxes were collected by the army from the es along the road to Vienna. In the next war period, tz-Pasarowitz (1699–1718), *jizya* taxes were not collected from ovinces in Rumelia especially Tamishvar, Belgrad, and Bosnia for /ears<sup>10</sup>. In this period, as mentioned above, revenues from some s did not reach the central budget because of the needs of the army e military expedition. As a result of these, there was a decrease in icient of autonomous taxes from 13.571 in the Vienna-Karlowitz ) 11.670 in the Karlowitz-Pasarowitz period. The lower coefficient ertval of the war with Iran can be related to the accelerated isation of provinces and local revenues during the war times of the ation period. Although the autonomous tax for the first two periods same, it is lower in the Karlowitz-Pasarowitz period. This was a hich many lands in Rumelia mutually changed hands with Austria. ese temporary gains and losses, the collection of the revenues was / and autonomous taxes decreased. All these indicated that in war there was a tax income loss while the war expenditures were isly growing, which is one of the factors that makes the deficit ility problem of the Empire more serious in that period.

*Revenues-Expenditures Relationship for Each Different War Period.*

Period	Constant	Expenditures	D <sub>t</sub>	D <sub>t</sub> * Expenditures	SSR
Iran	13.725**	0.215	-0.978	0.084	613.456
	(27.574)	(7.357)	(-1.132)	(1.702)	
Karlowitz	13.571**	0.241	-3.529**	0.177	612.808
	(30.905)	(9.533)	(-3.463)	(2.975)	
Pasarowitz	11.670**	0.345	2.972**	-0.177	645.723
	(23.134)	(11.892)	(3.485)	(-3.575)	

\* Indicates a significance level of 10%.

\*\* Indicates a significance level of 5%.

t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated coefficients.

Empirical evidence elaborated on above suggests that both the Mahmut I and the Iranian war period had a favourable budget management. In

order to assess which of these two was the main reason for the favourable environment we estimate the Equation 2 for Iranian war period (1723–1746) by adding a dummy variable for the Mahmut I era. The estimates are reported in Table 4. Note that the induce revenue is 0.697 for the non- Mahmut I era and 1.490 (0.697 + 0.793) for the Mahmut I era. This clearly suggests that Mahmut I, not the Iranian war era provided the sustainable budget. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that autonomous revenue decreased in Mahmut I era but this might be considered as favourable in the view of the taxpayers relative to for the Ottoman economy as a whole.

Table 4: Mahmut I in the Iranian war period.

	Constant	Expenditures	D <sub>Mahmut-Iran</sub>	D <sub>Mahmut-Iran*</sub> Expenditures	SSR
War with Iran (1723-1746)	4.922**	0.697	-13.892**	0.793	986.649
	(1.668)	(4.120)	(-10.050)	(9.745)	

Note: \* Indicates a significance level of 10%.

\*\* Indicates a significance level of 5%.

t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated coefficients.

Table 5 analyses the connection between *julus*, the payment made to *Janissaries* when a new sultan is crowned, and deficit sustainability. The coefficient of the constant term for the *julus* payment period is lower, so there is a decrease in autonomous revenues. These payments seem to worsen the deficit sustainability. However, induced expenditures increase with *julus*. F-test value of the *julus* payment dates reported in Table 5 is 9.58, which is statistically significant. It indicates that *julus* payments led to changes in the fiscal dynamics of the Empire.

Table 5: Revenues-Expenditures Relationship for Julus Period.

	Constant	DC <sub>t</sub>	Expenditures	DC <sub>t</sub> * Expenditures	SSR
Full Sample Period (1680-1747)	12.844**	-2.831**	0.276	0.163	654.369
	(30.467)	(-1.698)	(11.314)	(1.708)	

Note: \* Indicates a significance level of 10%.

\*\* Indicates a significance level of 5%.

t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated coefficients.

was elaborated on earlier in this section, one might argue that budget sustainability cannot be interpreted through the estimated coefficient of  $\alpha$ , but that the autonomous taxation should also be taken into account. To address this issue, we regress expenditures–revenue ratio on the variables used in Tables 3–5. Interestingly, all constant terms for these variables are greater than one (Table 6) and none of the estimated coefficients of the variables are statistically significant at the 10% level. This might suggest the sustainability of the budget. However, autonomous taxation is not proportionate to expenditures, so deficit sustainability in the long–run, is in question.

Estimation of Budget Sustainability by Using (Revenues/Expenditures) Ratio.

	Constant	Djulus	DI*Expenditure	DMI	SSR
Sample	1.025** (3.577)				52118.230
Y	1.017* (1.243)				5140.250
II	1.006 (0.937)	$\alpha$			2281.307
	1.006 (0.829)				3052.674
I	1.025* (1.517)				5091.085
II	1.038**				26695.680
	1.032** (2.801)				36239.240
Kartowitz	1.011* (1.768)				11729.790
to Pasarowitz	1.034* (1.785)				20892.570
Iran War	1.024 (2.479)**				13421.610
Periods	1.026** (3.439)	-0.091 (-0.008)			52071.190
Periods & Iranian	1.026** (2.879)		-0.025 (-0.004)		52106.52
Periods during the	1.026** (3.120)			-0.033 (-0.005)	52102.59

\*\*Indicates a significance level of 10%.

\*Indicates a significance level of 5%.

t-statistics are reported in parentheses under the corresponding estimated coefficients.

DI: Dummy variable set in the Iranian war era.

DMI: Dummy variable set in Mahmut I's Sultanate during the Iranian war.

If one considers that the budget was sustainable we consider this with the expenditures–revenue ratio, then the best terms of the periods are associated with the lowest constant and the highest slope terms. Similarly, the worse terms are associated with the highest constant and lowest slope terms.

To sum up, as a result of the evaluation of the regression results, we can argue that a general unsustainable budget deficit dominates in the sample period. The only fiscal recovery in real terms is in the sultanate of Mahmut I.

## 5. Conclusions

In this paper budget deficit sustainability has been examined during one of the transition periods (1680–1750) of the Ottoman Empire. 1680 was chosen as the starting point because it coincides with the beginning of the decline period of the Empire. Examining this period provided an opportunity to observe the effects of wars, as well as political and fiscal system changes upon the central budget and deficit sustainability.

The empirical evidence gathered in this paper suggests that during the sample period, except for the sultanate era of Mahmut I, the Ottoman budget was not sustainable. The other interesting result of the study is that *julus* payments have a significant tax increasing effect and the distribution of *julus* deteriorated the sustainability of the budget.

When we consider the other sultanate eras and war periods, we see the coefficients of expenditures are less than one in Table 1 and Table 2, which underlines the view that serious unsustainable budget deficit problems cannot be eliminated, even with small recoveries and a few sustainable deficit periods. At the end of the sample in 1747, fiscal problems became even more serious. The first foreign debt was undertaken in 1854 and the creditors established a foreign debt management system (*Duyun-u Umumiyye*) in 1881. Furthermore, the heavy fiscal problems of the Empire remained unsolved, affecting the economy of the new Turkish Republic from the dissolution of the empire to the second half of 1950s. The actual end of the fiscal problems of the empire was 1954, the year in which the young Turkish Republic paid the last instalment of the Empire's foreign debt.



## NOTES

- . The data set is reported in the Appendix A.
- . All the Ottoman names and terms written in italic are explained in the Appendix B.
- . Marsigli G., *Osmanli Imparatorlugu'nun Zuhur ve Terakkisinden Ihiati Zamanina Kadar Askeri Vaziyeti*, pp. 294, Ankara (1934).
- . Nuri M., *Netayicu'l-vukuat*, V. II, pp. 88, Istanbul (1909).
- . One may look at Pamuk (1990) for details
- . Griffiths, Hill, and Judge, *Learning and Practicing Econometrics*, pp.411-424, U.S.A (1992).
- . Tabakoglu, pp 117-119, Istanbul (1985).
- . Tabakoglu, pp. 136-7, Istanbul (1985).
- . Barkan O.L., *1669-70 Ottoman Budget and Its Extensions*, IUIF . M.C. XVII, No: 1-4, pp 225-303, Istanbul (1960).
- . MM.22249, pp 121-130 1687-88 Budget
- . Kepeci, 2313; MM22249, pp. 131-136, 1690-91 Budgets
- . 1691-92 Budget, MM the same notebook, pp. 137-149; MM. 12 603 (Budget)
- . 1692-93 Budget MM the same notebook, pp.150-157.
- . 1693-94 Budget MM the same notebook, pp. 158-164
- . 1693-94 Budget MM the same notebook, pp. 38-43
- . 1696-97 Budget MM the same notebook, pp. 44-53; Cevdet, Maliye,
- . 1698-99 Budget MM the same notebook, pp. 54-56, pp. 66-79
- . 1700-01 Budget MM the same notebook, pp. 80-105
- . 1701-2 Budget MM the same notebook, pp.106-120, Kepeci, 2324 (Budget)
- . 1703-4-5, 1710-11 Budget MM the same notebook, pp.1-37, MM.15 724.
- . Mud. 111, pp. 694, 1 113/30, VI,1701.

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## APPENDIX A: Terms and Concepts\*

Ottoman monetary unit based on silver.

A tax levied in extraordinary situations, especially in war times. It could be on agricultural products.

Local governor.

Yadesman

A tax collected from the non-Muslims living in the empire on per capita

payment made to Janissaries when a sultan starts reigning.

Personal prosperity of the sultan.

The Ottoman land code of 1858 also sought to modernize the state's revenue collection.

A tax levied in extraordinary situations. When cash was needed, the tax was collected from the wealthy people of the Istanbul.

Permanent and horseless army of the Ottoman Empire; the crucial element of the Kapikulu soldiers.

A payment made to the Kapikulu soldiers (the main part of the Ottoman army) which consists of infantry soldiers, Janissaries and soldiers with horse) four times a year in hict months Muharrem, Rebiulahir, Recep, and Seval.

A production method that was operated by collecting revenues of the administration or taking operational rights of some monopolies (like a minting coins) or being the only purchaser of some products.

An extraordinary tax collected in war times from the cities and villages along the road of the military expedition. Nuzul was a tax generally based on land and barley collected per household. The tax could be converted into cash or used by the army or cash.

Notebooks containing daily entries of the imperial budget.

A tax application put into practice especially in war times. It was an application for subjects of the Empire which made them responsible for supplying horses, food and firewood for the army at a determined price. This tax was collected as cash when needed.

In this system, there was no fed army. Instead of agricultural lands are given to the army in order to be cultivated during the times rest of the wars. This system was called as *malikane* and the owners of the lands were called as *malikaneholders* performing for charity.

\*Terms and concepts see Midhat Setraglu, *Osmali Tarihi* (1986).

## APPENDIX B: Budget Revenue and Spending of the Empire

Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures	Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures	Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures	Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures
1090M1	N/A	7482570	1092M7	9830029	15120899	1095M1	3379077	3555648	1097M7	24166551	31513715
1090M2	N/A	45502424	1092M8	9830029	47393199	1095M2	6081750	60637	1097M8	7740476	12755516
1090M3	N/A	2494295	1092M9	82838420	31034158	1095M3	66636338	92354707	1097M9	14484833	37023256
1090M4	N/A	34720715	1092M10	20825106	29921465	1095M4	55160428	65869404	1097M10	N/A	N/A
1090M5	N/A	72431737	1092M11	30302883	67334677	1095M5	53219003	43790646	1097M11	8454614	4645460
1090M6	N/A	6327625	1092M12	67022931	100293112	1095M6	54716882	33605990	1097M12	4697085	39794288
1090M7	N/A	11540555	1093M1	40472252	9713435	1095M7	17140579	33364089	1098M1	21756890	17240139
1090M8	N/A	59217362	1093M2	45307959	7442177	1095M8	76792035	62759074	1098M2	6263087	7636185
1090M9	N/A	68130606	1093M3	14604116	49750978	1095M9	44422844	30943593	1098M3	35324532	14697788
1090M10	N/A	15796265	1093M4	20921234	13171376	1095M10	56538076	37534385	1098M4	2723576	13620518
1090M11	N/A	40454560	1093M5	49408388	5076789	1095M11	60808234	101821134	1098M5	21231978	2587753
1090M12	N/A	48441321	1093M6	18566514	49840097	1095M12	23981486	19506343	1098M6	23955432	147968652
1091M1	37888570	6064746	1093M7	41391374	19968668	1096M1	59559149	35624382	1098M7	51347540	28546689
1091M2	30962142	53887831	1093M8	9116450	36909224	1096M2	108931705	55609353	1098M8	16640653	20973960
1091M3	15270107	17841748	1093M9	128185614	71794127	1096M3	12258057	43440991	1098M9	2759106	8403777
1091M4	59592517	26313757	1093M10	17878069	31749415	1096M4	11071982	28286134	1098M10	N/A	N/A
1091M5	36473117	49896326	1093M11	9575474	36285011	1096M5	25115625	29734381	1098M11	12390495	909537
1091M6	7299133	7521112	1093M12	27998446	89246673	1096M6	22041405	57591466	1098M12	1073163	765736
1091M7	37099649	18436380	1094M1	17530588	3831131	1096M7	36108705	67926590	1099M1	190197172	6783627
1091M8	41388366	75446732	1094M2	27436265	23478520	1096M8	35636055	26409358	1099M2	20402771	4844898
1091M9	87408019	62803789	1094M3	64506962	59287576	1096M9	145150373	104346197	1099M3	74114861	128788791
1091M10	23744083	91517111	1094M4	63170496	21805202	1096M10	5489739	1765640	1099M4	38925227	35945150
1091M11	21711708	44229022	1094M5	110106470	46127313	1096M11	66647759	33960751	1099M5	31237951	40182452
1091M12	18754190	29381167	1094M6	9694625	9697554	1096M12	10824912	18700426	1099M6	29024762	15888712
1092M1	47613856	26800646	1094M7	2894800	31381120	1097M1	41961880	86107695	1099M7	26696549	32964361
1092M2	14676313	6235452	1094M8	2931729	79255609	1097M2	55317557	23751559	1099M8	69847800	28892568
1092M3	20953821	9138308	1094M9	34677480	30898783	1097M3	27987830	42740935	1099M9	37444068	24078991
1092M4	39802867	28500596	1094M10	6634540	6286318	1097M4	73111655	40427701	1099M10	124463944	28382095
1092M5	12818812	42266935	1094M11	29927094	2934731	1097M5	174281526	136696114	1099M11	26540414	33192300
1092M6	56887861	30707696	1094M12	24747157	9584405	1097M6	24347096	13358335	1099M12	12695195	152952280





						1680-1747			1747-1808		
Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures	Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures	Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures	Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures
1144M1	78190578	76657756	1146M10	72764683	66984122	1149M7	180322562	154565899	1152M4	6248543	36877033
1144M2	30826430	266208564	1146M11	67152232	34225248	1149M8	18055107	2593797	1152M5	44744168	21760778
1144M3	378269896	195053212	1146M12	136863202	50865832	1149M9	31649601	179449560	1152M6	58050948	47162832
1144M4	80160488	48329602	1147M1	92981820	189487238	1149M10	14542914	26619135	1152M7	64910195	307157581
1144M5	79454045	200251399	1147M2	27962951	24284139	1149M11	31176804	31825027	1152M8	269717814	5849812
1144M6	35556479	39041264	1147M3	43684659	68279286	1149M12	399660698	346086122	1152M9	82259527	6494908
1144M7	32271576	93278217	1147M4	140546694	76020042	1150M1	50118596	51485883	1152M10	84065839	63837900
1144M8	432485796	368855770	1147M5	110501710	7429270	1150M2	24292012	26570178	1152M11	66599088	437344775
1144M9	53328051	69830819	1147M6	118408097	231311230	1150M3	85976608	65132581	1152M12	29142962	21723115
1144M10	20671793	32416259	1147M7	94901093	30329391	1150M4	28270400	47503849	1153M1	120748815	6160505
1144M11	283877438	158002544	1147M8	253276771	63435624	1150M5	147469298	125261711	1153M2	128742688	19149674
1144M12	145432412	158253886	1147M9	40044856	49249879	1150M6	62432251	63967025	1153M3	61070306	57045378
1145M1	199773979	69202528	1147M10	71453114	119199022	1150M7	69948225	23438585	1153M4	17260499	7673858
1145M2	46354222	49032613	1147M11	27639669	25488077	1150M8	205477971	55668126	1153M5	60349923	4731274
1145M3	57538107	254806621	1147M12	54128455	279776625	1150M9	104129988	31875659	1153M6	102627134	216160295
1145M4	48119366	63674944	1148M1	99546061	27590351	1150M10	281534331	125101352	1153M7	152730527	25210861
1145M5	76623864	191702114	1148M2	159964081	147596974	1150M11	235538180	170432404	1153M8	292766753	235764632
1145M6	161820499	196657142	1148M3	117408911	97656560	1150M12	75212915	21436185	1153M9	39905698	17037676
1145M7	42500671	56802298	1148M4	67645488	192397693	1151M1	56056888	48928731	1153M10	46706109	787719120
1145M8	365382934	214292712	1148M5	49723424	3301908	1151M2	32364438	40535490	1153M11	35292263	31841534
1145M9	70033643	382554215	1148M6	94520495	26822455	1151M3	38257879	36411453	1153M12	51218172	6078875
1145M10	51716888	50302944	1148M7	89246735	168700577	1151M4	29357936	47580125	1154M1	108366166	93555077
1145M11	97188217	75726080	1148M8	228564968	316728321	1151M5	24704272	23192973	1154M2	148715017	208665493
1145M12	81762427	34459951	1148M9	22951189	3752093	1151M6	137198033	36337987	1154M3	57283701	13146385
1146M1	90510171	22232699	1148M10	27791433	1795398	1151M7	292923733	62571120	1154M4	38636107	5586590
1146M2	73567872	94872930	1148M11	40085545	5033495	1151M8	124961001	35859827	1154M5	111398799	3742793
1146M3	71218920	216126029	1148M12	75141965	6075399	1151M9	103088130	68993940	1154M6	132175435	127362931
1146M4	122434839	84843420	1149M1	43278908	162234974	1151M10	80995723	71843353	1154M7	233436601	198758966
1146M5	105839377	171502692	1149M2	111001201	33258915	1151M11	204711241	47538222	1154M8	479617872	32600246
1146M6	117710132	127726360	1149M3	73892372	26925978	1151M12	111744883	49374495	1154M9	44703520	29855466
1146M7	123604382	95639664	1149M4	33688871	36255663	1152M1	81102396	251682552	1154M10	16964148	11446585
1146M8	208414667	322444435	1149M5	23294677	9142730	1152M2	97799535	36707915	1154M11	36643073	24006798
1146M9	177061513	89644666	1149M6	116562575	106474140	1152M3	39558631	1.011E+09	1154M12	9140932	3145985

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						1680-1747			1747-1808		
Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures	Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures	Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures	Hijri Years	Revenue	Expenditures
1155M1	70394879	353739503	1156M5	86859409	62195365	1157M9	88553154	55862269	1159M1	33530604	5483618
1155M2	267199365	185567116	1156M6	146646532	242661456	1157M10	27521987	12651771	1159M2	67265870	186632980
1155M3	440126627	441027968	1156M7	141697818	70912026	1157M11	54322067	42050021	1159M3	N/A	80196992
1155M4	221397752	137253090	1156M8	318115778	299971129	1157M12	120994411	482175708	1159M4	N/A	10817306
1155M5	91456888	114376642	1156M9	69694942	18047966	1158M1	69928206	52201026	1159M5	N/A	44289200
1155M6	112377597	44376063	1156M10	128169934	78460348	1158M2	187687309	48307252	1159M6	N/A	2626908
1155M7	107194827	53993719	1156M11	122806960	97935768	1158M3	96562593	231449479	1159M7	N/A	200401986
1155M8	236193874	184911546	1156M12	10771387	405198778	1158M4	40396058	49941068	1159M8	N/A	28842541
1155M9	28271689	1639410	1157M1	121200373	147782322	1158M5	98980930	42671970	1159M9	N/A	432621740
1155M10	62591189	59207922	1157M2	187225770	34011472	1158M6	158400025	212889286	1159M10	N/A	11647288
1155M11	15202513	506669	1157M3	29553949	13693413	1158M7	179428818	54540656	1159M11	N/A	2904309
1155M12	21885214	444849849	1157M4	55600229	44635624	1158M8	286184709	357376442	1159M12	N/A	1442545
1156M1	19420548	24890900	1157M5	119719185	236631705	1158M9	51750584	34069487			
1156M2	228330611	96677556	1157M6	126185351	52132139	1158M10	22609669	4488088			
1156M3	74922803	34873243	1157M7	116828570	192156844	1158M11	27074040	11567130			
1156M4	60535099	48911424	1157M8	220602459	32453372	1158M12	56381434	10956352			

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