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One marked disparity between the ideas of Aquinas and Aristotle arises when one considers their different approaches to the question of how we should be ruled. Even if one accepts that Aquinas's `perfect city' is commensurate with Aristotle's `good state', in that both refer to empirical communities and the system of rulership which is perceived to be `in their best interests', the premises upon which these two states are founded are not the same.
Both Aristotle and Aquinas put forward the notion of legitimate rule. Such a notion requires one to ask upon what ground can such rule be legitimised. Any form of government requires something outside of itself to confer legitimacy upon it. Without this, it would appear arbitrary and hence not legitimate. Conventionally it is understood that the only means by which a form of rule can obtain `absolute' legitimacy is by appeal to some notion of (absolute) truth. The difference which appear between Aristotle and Aquinas can be seen to arise through different ideas of what constitutes this notion of truth.
Aristotle conceives of man as a rational animal. Through a process of inductive reasoning, he surmises that it is this rationality which, ultimately, distinguishes man from other living things. All rationality, Aristotle believes, leads to an end. He thus concludes that it is in man's nature to pursue a certain end. Such an end, as it is absolute, can be taken to indicate Aristotle's `truth'. For Aristotle this `truth' is most often figured as `happiness' (eudaemonia) or `good'. While these notions can be seen to exist in and for individuals, they are only understood in their full form when they exist in relation to the whole community as the `good' of the community as a whole is `better' than the good of a few.
Returning to the idea of the right form of rule, it can be understood that the `truth' which grounds rule for Aristotle is `the good', a truth which can be attained through rational thought or reason.
Turning to Aquinas, we see not only a different notion of truth at work, but also a different means by which this truth is attained. As Aquinas is a Christian, he takes the ultimate truth to be God or, as it is often phrased, the `divine will'. As (according to Christian doctrine) God is good and would only ever will the good, it could be understood that, essentially, both writers' ideas of the truth are very much the same. However, Aquinas's insistence on God as the ground of good necessitates that his idea of how `the good' is attained is more complicated. Where, as we have seen, for Aristotle reason is the predominant vehicle by which one can attain truth, for Aquinas reason is only secondary.
Importantly, for Aquinas, God is perfect and we (human beings) are not. Thus, while divine reason will always be perfect, ours will always be fallible. This suggests that reason on its own is never going to be sufficient to reach the `truth'. Thus, were Aristotle's attainment of `truth' could rely on only reason, Aquinas requires another concept. This second concept is `faith'. Faith in God, for Aquinas, ensures that we do not succumb to the belief that our reason is absolute or perfect. Such a belief could do little but lead us to error as, as stated above, our reason is imperfect. By maintaining faith in God we maintain an openness which allows our erroneous ways to be `corrected', whether by divine intervention or revelation.
Taking the above differences into consideration, it can be seen that Aquinas's `perfect city' and Aristotle's `good polis' cannot, ulimately, be the same thing. While both `states' will pursue `the good' of the whole community, how this pursuit is carried out will differ. Aristotle's fundamental reliance on reason necessarily means that his state will be governed, fundamentally, by reason, by rational institutions. Aquinas's state, on the other hand, while still giving great importance to reason would necessarily insist upon religious institutions which would maintain the openness to God which Aquinas believes is necessary for the correction of our fallacious reasoning. By extension, we can suppose that these religious institutions would necessarily have some political or legislative function as without this they would not be in a position to `correct'.
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