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``no man is just of his own free will, but only under compulsion''
Glaucon argues that the unjust man, in order to be ``thoroughly unjust'' [p.47], must be adept at concealing his unjustness, at avoiding detection in his wrongdoings. For Glaucon, ``the most accomplished form of injustice is to seem just when you are not.'' [p. 47] The unstated assumption in Glaucon's speech is that is desirable to seem or to be perceived as just. Glaucon is assuming that justice precludes certain material benefits and, moreover, that society values a) the appearance of justice and b) the material gains that justice might preclude. What Glaucon is pointing to is an essential contradiction at the core of our values.
This contradiction is the result of the social contract or `compact'. Glaucon is working from the premise that ``it is according to nature a good thing to inflict wrong or injury, and a bad thing to suffer it'' [p.45]. That is to say, our natural instinct is, at one and the same time, to inflict suffering on others and to attempt to avoid suffering ourselves. As it would seem inevitable that these instincts would come into contradiction with each other, that where the inflicting of suffering is commonplace, someone is going to have to suffer, and that that someone could always be ourselves, the sensible course is to make a pact such that we will all refrain from inflicting suffering with the aim that we will then all be spared from suffering ourselves. What such a compact cannot do, however, is remove or otherwise affect the instinct to inflict suffering. This instinct, however repressed, remains intact.
What this means, for Glaucon, is that it is only in the light of a social contract, only because of social pressure that we might be inclined towards the just way or just behaviour. If the possibility of being discovered in our wrongdoing were lifted, we would no longer have any reason to behave in a just manner. To illustrate this point, Glaucon tells the story of Gyges' Ring. The ring possess magical properties whereby it can render the wearer invisible. In such a state of invisibility, the wearer can behave exactly as he or she wishes with no fear of detection. In effect, the person who wears the ring has stepped beyond the social contract. As Glaucon's premise holds, our natural instinct is to do wrong. Thus, in possession of the ring, one would naturally pursue one's true instinct and do wrong. There would, for Glaucon be no reason to do otherwise. In wearing the ring, one steps beyond society's rules and no longer has any reason to obey.
In answer to the question as to why one might obey were one in possession of Gyges' Ring, Glaucon's answer would be that not only would one have no reason to obey but, moreover, one would not obey. If, however, one puts Glaucon's premise in question, his conclusion is also subject to question. The notion that one would necessary act unjustly in possession of Gyges' Ring only holds true if one accepts that by nature man is unjust or is prone to wrong-doing. If on the contrary, one assumes that man will by nature act justly, or do right, then one would be inclined to argue that possessing Gyge's Ring would have little or no effect on one's moral actions. That is, if one is by nature inclined towards the good, then whether or not one could be observed, one would act in a good way.
What this position does not address, however, is the notion of obedience. If one is naturally inclined towards justice or the good, and one acts in this way even while in possession of Gyges' Ring, then is one obeying and if so, what is one obeying?
Plato, through Socrates posits that there exists a true and eternal good, the sovereign good, and that the correct education will give rise to acceptance and understanding of this good. If one accepts this idea, then it follows that one would accept that ``injustice has the worst possible effect on the mind and justice the reverse'' [p.54]. As such, even in possession of Gyges' Ring, the educated man would act justly as he ``would be his own best protector, because he would be afraid that by doing wrong he was doing himself a grave and lasting injury.'' [p. 54] In such a situation one is obeying one's reason, or one's understanding of the truth, and one's own natural desire to protect oneself from injury.
All references to Plato, (1974) trans. Lee, Desmond, The Republic (London: Penguin)
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