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Oltadaki Balýk: Türkiye (The Fish on the Hook: Turkey), by M. Emin Deðer, 4th ed. 1994, 374 pages. Available from Çýnar Yayýnlarý, Rýfat Ilgaz Kültür Merkezi, Küçükparmakkapý Sokak, No. 23, Beyoðlu, 80060 Ýstanbul.
On the 25th anniversary of the 12 March 1971 military coup-by-communiqué in Turkey, the Ðstanbul daily Cumhuriyet published an interview with a Navy officer (Ret) who had been involved in the numerous leftist cliques in the military at the time (Leyla Tavþanoðlu, "Söyleþi," March 10, 1996, page 8). The coup was made to obstruct a socialist military junta from taking over. Cited among the officers who had been part of a clique was Col. Emin Deðer, Military Judge (Ret), author of the book under review.
The overall theme is neo-imperialism and how it works, especially within the context of US interests in the Middle East. First, De¤er focuses on Turkey, which he describes as the "gendarme of US interests in the Middle East," a role that was bestowed upon the country at minimum material cost to the US. Secondly, the author discusses how US foreign policy is shaped by the interests of multinational firms. Accordingly, the method used to render dependent upon the US key countries which are geo-strategically important for US economic interests is to proffer aid and education. Deðer considers aid as an instrument for US leverage on political and economic decision-making. He contends, further, that Turkish people who have gone through the US education system either in this country or in the States are alienated from their own society. And, once these people attain key positions in the military or civilian bureaucracy they only follow policies that benefit the US.
The author goes on to discuss Turkish-US relations within the parameters of sovereignty, total independence and dependence. Deðer is very critical about the bi-lateral agreements concluded between the two countries. In essence, his overall evaluation of the relationship is that Turkey was entrapped through military aid, IMF and AID to remain within the capitalist camp. And when there was a leftist Prime Minister such as Bülent Ecevit in power during 1977-1978, all the preconditions for his failure were provided by the US and IMF. The US had withdrawn from Turkey the status of most-favored nation for trade over problems with opium cultivation and Cyprus, and IMF and the World Bank refused to extend credits unless stringent economic measures were taken. Since Ecevit did not agree to implement them, his government was refused credit; social disturbances continued, upon which he resigned. By inference, Deðer concludes that Ecevit had to resign on account of his socialist stance. However, when he discusses the reasons for the last military coup of 12 September 1980 about a hundred pages earlier, he affirms that Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel's rightist coalition was just as reluctant to apply all of the measures that the 24 January 1980 Economic Reform Packet foresaw. The author concludes that stringent economic measures regarding taxes, employment, and liberalization of the economy could only be imposed by a majority civilian government under military tutelage, as that of the Özal government formed in 1983. Peculiarly enough, he does not compare the number of political parties before and after the coup, nor does he criticize the election system.
Oltadaki Balýk: Türkiye is a very exhausting book to read, regardless of whether one agrees or disagrees with the author's premises. It is exhausting because it is highly categorical, full of half-truths, chronologically out of context, and full of conspiracy theories. It is not the intent here to claim that Turkish-US relations have always been paved with good intentions. But the reader expects a sophisticated style and approach from a person with law training who claims to use the dialectical method in writing.
The major dilemma stems from defining Turkey's problems from the so-called "Kemalist left" viewpoint. Qualifying any ideology as Kemalist somehow links it to patriotism and renders it legitimate. However, Kemalism/Atatürkism was never an ideology, and had no theoretical basis as such. This is very clear when one reads the etatist literature of the 1930s written by the ruling elite such as Ðsmet Ðnönü, Recep Peker et al. They were careful to distinguish the political and economic system in Turkey as being different from socialism or fascism.
And indeed Turkey opted in the aftermath of World War II to join the Western family of nations, i.e., democracies, hence the capitalist camp. But the age-old problems between industrialized and non-industrialized nations continued, with the former constantly advising Turkey to remain an agricultural country. The policy-makers did not comply.
Secondly, US military aid did indeed create an aura of dependence whereby Turkey's freedom of maneuver was severely limited. Between 1960 and 1970, un-controlled American freedom of action on Turkish soil, as in the cases of unauthorized U-2 flights and downing of US reconnaissance flights, twice caused diplomatic scandals between Turkey and the Soviet Union. Thirdly, as the book asserts, Richard Perle in 1978 and Gen. Alexander Haig in 1983 stated that the Turkish Armed Forces were not equipped to handle anything but a defensive war, and a short one at that. Perhaps the most relevant question the book asks is why the TAF was in the shape it was after 45 years of military aid.
No wonder then that even the most "pro-American" Chief Executive of Turkey, the late Turgut Özal, insisted on more trade and less aid. All relationships are fragile and perhaps international relations are more so. However, blaming outsiders and their so-called native collaborators for all the ills of the country appears like Third World sentimentalism to which Turkey should not subscribe.
Lastly, it is difficult to assess to whom this book would appeal. It definitely does not appeal to patriots who believe, not in a socialist revolution, but, where necessary, in the role of a social state.