

Philosophy of Logic and Language 0108

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Wk 1: Proper names

'Names are rigid designators.' Does it follow that names do not have sense?

Readings

G. Frege, 'On Sense and Reference', in M. Black and P.T. Geach (eds),

Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, first

ten pages (up to discussion of subordinate clauses).

S.A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (1980), pp. 1-97.

Further readings

M.A.E. Dummett, *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, pp. 135-143; pp. 146-151.

B.A.W. Russell, 'On Denoting', repr. in: Russell, *Logic and Knowledge* (1956) and in many other places

WK 2: MEANING

'The meaning of a simple declarative sentence is a relation between utterances and described situations'. Discuss. How, if at all, does this view contrast with the view that knowledge of the meaning of a statement is knowledge of the condition under which it is true?

Readings

Davidson, 'Truth and Meaning', in: *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*.

Barwise, J. and Perry, J. (1983) *Situations and Attitudes*. The MIT Press. (pp. 3-26)

Further readings

Davidson, 'True to the Facts', in: *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*.

Dummett, M.A.E., *Frege: Philosophy of Language*, p. 445 and pp. 455-471.

WK 3: TRUTH

'Truth is not a substantial property.' How should this claim be interpreted? What can be said for or against it?

Readings

Dummett, M.A.E. (1959) 'Truth', in his *Truth and Other Enigmas*, pp. 4-8.

Horwich, P. (1999) 'The Minimalist Conception of Truth', in: Blackburn and Simmons (eds.) *Truth* (1999).

Soames, S. (1999) *Understanding Truth*. Oxford University Press, ch. 8.

A. Tarski, 'The Semantic Conception of Truth', in L. Linsky (ed), *Semantics and the Philosophy of Language*.

Further readings

Austin, J.L. (1950) 'Truth', in: *Proc. of the Arist. Soc.*, Suppl. vol. 24, pp. 111-28.

Soames, S. (1999) *Understanding Truth*. Oxford University Press, ch. 2.

Field, H. (1994) 'Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse', *Philosophical Review* (103), pp. 405-9 only. [available through JStore]

WK 4: VAGUENESS AND OBSERVATION

Is the phænomenon of vagueness due to the perceptual capacities of human observers?

Readings

Dummett, M.A.E. (1975) 'Wang's Paradox', in his *Truth and Other Enigmas*, repr. in Keefe and Smith (1997).

Graff, D. (2001) 'Phenomenal continua and the Sorites', in: *Mind* 110, pp. 1-40.

Further readings

Wright, C.J.G. (1975) 'On the coherence of vague predicates', in: *Synthese* 30, pp. 325-65.

WK 5: VAGUENESS BY DEGREES

How can the principle of bivalence be preserved within the degree theory? [If you have time, you might also wish to address the question: Has there any real progress achieved by the degree theory compared to the supervaluationist semantics?]

Readings

Edgington, D.M. 'Vagueness by degrees', in: Keefe and Smith (1997)

Machina, K. 'Truth, belief and vagueness', repr. in: Keefe and Smith (1997)

Further readings

Fine, K. 'Vagueness, truth and logic', repr. in: Keefe and Smith (1997)

Williamson, T. *Vagueness* (1994), ch. 4 (until §4.15)

WK 6: VAGUENESS AND IGNORANCE

How does the epistemic view explain the application of vague predicates to borderline cases?

Readings

Cargile, J. 'The Sorites paradox', repr. in: Keefe and Smith (1997)

Williamson, T. 'Vagueness and ignorance', repr. in: Keefe and Smith (1997)

Further readings

Williamson, T. *Vagueness* (1994), chs. 7,8

Gomez-Torrente, M. (2001) 'Vagueness and margin for error principles', in: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 64(1)

WK 7: THE INDETERMINACY OF TRANSLATION

When Quine denies the determinacy of translation, what exactly is he denying? Is he right to do so?

Readings

W.V.O. Quine, *Word and Object*, ch. 2.

W.V.O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in: *From a Logical Point of View*.

Searle, J. 'Indeterminacy, Empiricism, and the First Person', in: *Journal of Philosophy* (1987) 84, pp. 123-146.

WK 8: ANALYTICITY

Is it coherent to claim that there are statements true in virtue of meaning alone? Are there such statements?

Readings

W.V.O. Quine, 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', in: *From a Logical Point of View*.

G. Frege, *Foundations of Arithmetic*, §§1-14.

H.P. Grice and P.F. Strawson, 'In Defence of a Dogma', in: *Philosophical Review* 65 (1956), pp. 141-158.

Further readings

Dummett, M.A.E., 'The Significance of Quine's Indeterminacy Thesis', in: *Truth and Other Enigmas*.

Wk xx

If 'Vulcan' does not refer, how can 'Vulcan does not exist' be true?

Readings

M.G.J. Evans, *The Varieties of Reference* ch. 1, 10.

K. Walton, *Mimesis as Make-Believe*, pp. 35-43, 421-30

K. Donnellan, 'Speaking of Nothing', *Philosophical Review* 83 (1974), pp. 281-304.

Further readings

D.K. Lewis, 'Truth in Fiction', in his *Philosophical Papers* vol. 1

D.F. Pears and J. Thomson, 'Is Existence a Predicate?', in P.F. Strawson (ed), *Philosophical Logic*.

Wk xx

Is there any compelling reason for treating what someone means by uttering an expression as either more basic or less basic than what the expression means?

Readings

S. Blackburn, *Spreading the Word*, ch. 4.

J. Searle, 'Meaning and Speech Acts', *Philosophical Review* 71 (1962), 423-432.

H.P. Grice, 'Meaning', in P.F. Strawson (ed), *Philosophical Logic*.